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Summary:
A renewed interest in local government and decentralisation in developing countries has
emerged in recent years, and many students now turn to this subject. A substantialliterature
is already available, even if a lot more needs to be done. The present work is an attempt to
guide new students of African local government to some of these contributions. The first part
of the paper provides a rough categorisation of the literature, and the second part contains a
short presentation of books and artic1es. The bibliography is by no means complete.
Sammendrag:
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utviklingsland, og stadig fleire utviklingsforskarar orienterer seg mot dette feltet. Det finst alt
ein betydeleg litteratur om emnet, samstundes som mykje framleis er ugjort. Denne
bibliografien er eit forsøk på å gi ein introduksjon til ein del av denne litteraturen. Første del
innheld ein grov tematisk oversikt, og siste del innheld korte presentasjonar av ein del utvalde
bøker og artiklar. Bibliografien er på ingen måte fullstendig.
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L. Background and introduction
A renewed interest in local government and decentralisation has emerged in recent
years among scholars, government offcials, non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and in the international donor community (Jerve and Naustdalslid 1990;
Askvik and Jerve 1991; St. melding 51, 1991-92:226). There are several reasons
for this renewed interest.
(1) The recognition that popular participation has a potential to improve
government legitimacy, quality of project planning and implementation.
Furthermore, popular participation, it is contended, can best be achieved within a
system where political and administrative decisions are decentralised.
(2) The economic crisis in Africa. The crisis has undermined even further the
resource basis of African governments, and has forced them to adopt a "rollng
back the state" strategy. This tendency has been reinforced by the ideological
orientation of many donors in general, and by Structural Adjustment Programmes
in particular. Decentralisation may ease the pressure on scarce government
resources by improving efficiency and by mobilising resources and labour locally.
(3) The disappointing results of centralised government. The central planning and
implementation systems adopted in many African countries have not performed
well, and the response is a renewed interest in local government.
(4) The increasing interest in public administration in developing countries in
general. It has been recognised that unless the government institutions function
properly, neither donor assistance nor indigenous efforts are likely to produce the
desired results. The ro1e and potential of local governments are elements of this
larger issue.
In the present paper, the reader is given an introduction to some of the literature
on the issue of local government. The usefulness of the literature search is
reinforced by the cyc1ically changing interest in local government in Africa
(Mawhood 1983). It has been a central theme in development research ever since
the last years of colonialism, and it has played a varing role in the development
strategies of African countries (Kasfir 1983; Mutahaba 1989). Most African states
have been through periods of both centralisation and decentralisation, with mixed
experiences. Not surprisingly, there is a substantial and varied literature available
on local government in Africa, which is worthwhile to consider. This work is an
attempt to systematise the literature in order to give some guidance to new
students of local government in Africa.
Below, the type of literature wil be introduced, then categorised and finally, some
general remarks abóut the literature wil be made.
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2. Literature on local government and decentralisation
The principle underlying the search for relevant literature has been to look for
literature indexed under local government and decentralisation or containing these
key words in their titles. However, there are other types of literature which are
relevant for the study of sub-national administration, planning, decIsion making,
implementation and participation. The literature on integrated rural development
programmes, rural development and community development obviously have
insights valuable for local government research. This literature has been omitted
from this bibliography.
The contributions inc1uded in the bibliography examine local government in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The experiences and studies from Asia and Latin America are not
inc1uded, even though some authors make references to these geographical areas
as well.
As wil be shown below, many authors define decentralisation so as to inc1ude
privatisation, parastatals and cooperatives. However, they then often do not
examine these types of decentralisation, and concentrate their attention on
decentralisation within the political-administrative system. Even if cooperatives,
parastatals and privatisation are inc1uded in most definitions, they are seldom
studied as examples of decentralisation. Research on these kinds of decentralisa-
tion has to be found elsewhere.
Decentralisation may occur within purelyadministrative systems, and this type is
normally labelled deconcentration. Viable local governments in Africa depend on
deconcentration of the functional ministries, and deconcentration is often a
component in the development of local governments. But deconcentration can also
be justified for other reasons than local government and popular participation. It
is often simply a matter of improving the structure, i.e. the division of work within
an organisation (Leonard and Oyugi 1985). This literature is also omitted as we
focus on deconcentration only in conjunction with development of local govern-
ment, i.e. linked to political decentralisation.
Many contributions to the literature examine decentralisation reforms. The general
theoreticalliterature on reforms and reorganisation is huge, and varied. This body
of literature would also be relevant, but is left out of the present work.
Even with the said literature left out, the field is still very large. This bibliography
does not c1aim to inc1ude allliterature of interest, nor does it claim to represent
all the issues and perspectives. However, searching various sources (libraries,
indexes, list ofreferences) has led to the collection of a substantialliterature which
co vers a wide range of issues, and which may hopefully serve as auseful intro-
ductory guide to the field.
2
3. Categorising the literature
The literature items are presented alphabetically and with a short annotation aimed
at indicating the main focus of the items. The annotations are not standardised in
format, length or type of information. Such a solution would be unpractical as the
literature is quite varied in design and methodology.
Below, the items are presented in tabular form. The table shows how various
general themes and issues are treated, the geographical area the researcher is
concerned with and whether the theme is the primary issue for the author or a
secondar issue discussed in connection with another main theme. Finally, the
table indicates whether the author has written an empirical or a theoretical work.
The categorisation of issues does not represent a theoretically derived typology.
Rather, it reflects what the authors were concerned with. Such a method has its
weaknesses. It wil always be possible to subdivide categories or to define new
categories. It can always be argued that categories should be merged in order to
improve the overview. Hopefully, a balance has been reached, categorising the
literature well enough for it to be auseful guidance, but without splitting it up too
much. In total, 11 categories are applied. As most authors discuss several
important issues, most items are placed in more than one category. The categories
are as follows:
1. Conceptual elaborations
Many authors naturally elaborate on the concept of decentralisation and local
government. The definitions vary, but it is difficult to identify any significant
definitional controversy in what is being written. Fesler wrote in 1965 that the
concept of decentralisation is poorly developed and difficult to measure. Gasper
makes more or less the same point in an essay from 1991, and it is striking that
the theoretical definitions have remained very wide and imprecise. Perhaps the
most influential definition is the one presented by Nells and Rondinelli (1986),
distinguishing between devolution, administrative deconcentration, privatisation
and delegation to semi-autonomous functionally specialised organisations such as.
parastatals.
2. The rationale for local government
Many authors are concerned with why decentralisation of government is important
and worth doing. Decentralisation can be seen as a remedy for most ills The
reason is most likely to be that among donors and leaders in the Less Developed
Countries (LDCs), centralisation policies have been strong until recently, and man y
authors have felt a need to argue that decentralisation has merit. Most authors do
not say very much about the dilemmas between the many good purposes of local
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government, are rather uncritical of decentralisation and local government, and say
very little about possible negative effects.
Some of the contributions argue generally how decentralisation might promote
valued goals. Others, like Lee-Smith and Stren (1991) or Montgomery (1972)
examine more closely one particular advantage that is said to be promoted by
decentralisation.
3. Critiques of the rationale for local government
As noted, many authors are very optimistic about the potential of local
government, and many of them ignore the dilemmas and possible drawbacks of
such decentralised systems. But there is also a literature discussing whether
decentralisation is on balance a positive effort. They contend that decentralisation
might favour some values and suppress others, and that the advantages of
decentralisation are in many cases internally inconsistent.
4. The history of African local government
In several contributions, the history of local government is outlined. The starting
point was the colonial rulers' attempts at control. The political needs of the
colonial rulers have shaped local government to this day. The colonial heritage has
by some been described as a problem that reformers have tried to overcome
(Mutahaba 1989), while others have argued that the colonial district administration,
aiming at control, law and order, was a very convenient to ol for the independent
regimes to take up (Picard 1981).
5. Local government efficiency and technical performance
Efficiency is here understood as the costs of reaching an objective. Reaching the
objective can be done efficiently - at low cost - or ineffciently - at high cost.
Many authors discuss the low efficiency of local governments. Technical per-
formance is arelated, but wider concept, referring to whether the numerous
routines and rules of bureaucratic structures and planning procedures are adhered
to. Many authors discuss how factors in the environment of local governments, not
least the central government, influence and almost determine locallevel efficiency.
These authors provide familiar lists of shortages in the local government: shortages
of money, infrastructure, personneI, knowledge undermine the efficiency and
technical performance of the local governments. Furthermore, interference from
politicians and bureaucrats in the capital as well as local elites are factors that
often undermine locallevel efficiency. There are a few studies discussing cases
of satisfactory performance and efficiency and the conditions for such performance
are identified (Olowu and Smoke 1992; Sterkenburg 1990).
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6. Local government policy
There are some interesting studies which try to examine what values and interests
are promoted or neglected byexisting local governments, and why the local
government promotes these values and interests. These studies should be done
more often as most decentralisation reforms, as well as some donors ' beliefs, seem
to be based on very strong convictions about what wil be promoted by a
decentralised system. These studies show that the actual outcome of local
government policies and administration might very well be problematie in the light
of important values in the society (Keller 1977).
7. Decentralisation reforms
Africa has experienced many decentralisation reforms, and most of them have
been failures. Gasper notes that this conc1usion may be based on the mistake of
taking the rhetorics of the reform proposals too literally (1991). Conyers argues
that the western academic is often not able to appreciate the results that were
achieved, even if the stated goals were not reached completely (1986). With the se
reservations in mind, it is fair to say that most decentralisation reforms have run
into trouble and are seen as failures. These processes are extensively studied,
ilustrated by the long list of references.
The reasons found for the failures are varied, and similar to the reasons for poor
local government performance. They include the characteristics of the local
environment, of central government, the local government itself, the content and
design of the decentralisation reform, shortages of support and monitoring and
poor implementation of the reforms. Some studies add the influence of donors.
Several studies indicate that the failure of reforms in terms of stated goals might
conceal a success in terms of real, informal ruling elite goals (cp. Samoff's
articles).
8. Explaining centralisation
Studies of failed decentralisation reforms frequently refer to the interests and
attitudes of centrallevel power holders as reasons for failure. These tend to favour
centralisation and in many cases even reverse their own decentralisation reforms.
Several authors have discussed why the regimes are so basically centralist. The
typical African regime is by several authors described as being faced with the
dilemma of mobilising people while at the same time maintaining absolute central
control of policy making processes (Mawhood 1987).
5
9. Explaining the continued existence local government
The African experience with local government is not very good. It is filled with
stories of local government inefficiency and of reforms that failed because the
regime that decided on them acted according to traditional, centralist attitudes and
interests. It is well worth asking why the regimes continue to promote local
government and decentralisation. The authors listed under this category describe
the dilemma faced by LDC regimes, and their need to controllocal government.
10. Donors ' role in decentralisation
Donors have increasingly acted in favour of decentralisation and popular
participation by supporting local reform processes or NGOs promoting meaningful
popular paricipation. There are not many studies on donor experiences, but it
appears that donors can only play a modest role in decentralisation processes.
11. Research priorities
Finally, some authors are concerned with the further direction of research on local
government in Africa. One direction is to intensify studies of actually existing
local governments, another to examine closer how decentralisation can contribute
to development.
The authors' contributions to the various themes are categorised as follows in
tabular form. The table lists, under each issue, the author, the geographical area,
whether the theme is the primary or a secondary issue, and finally, whether the
contribution is mainly theoretical or empirically oriented.
P=Primar theme
S=Secondar theme
T=Theoretical approach
E=Empirical approach
Conceptual elaborations
Author
Conyers 1990
Davey 1983
Gasper 1991
Mutahaba 1989
Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991
Olowu and Smoke 1992
Country
Third World
Africa
Zimbabwe
Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia
Zimbabwe
Africa
P-S T-E
S T
S TÆ
S TÆ
S E
S E
S TE
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Conceptual elaborations
Author
Nellis and Rondinell 1986
Rondinell 1991 A
de Valk 1990C
Wunsch and Olowu 1990
Country P-S T-EThird World P TThird World S T
Zimbabwe S TAfrica P T
The rationale for local government
Author
Akpan 1990
Aziegbe 1991
Barkan and Chege 1989
Batley 1991
Bird 1987
Davey 1983
Lee-Smith and Stren 1991
Mannion and Brehony 1990
Mascarenhas 1989
Mawhood 1974
Mawhood 1983
Montgomery 1972
Mutahaba 1989
Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991B
Pausewang 1988
Rondinelli 1981
Rondinelli and Nells 1986
Wunsch and Olowu 1990
Country P-S T-S
Nigeria P T
Nigeria P EKenya S EAfrica S TÆThird World P TThird World P T ÆAfrica P TÆ
Tanzania P EThird World P T ÆThird World P T Æ
Africa P ElT
Third .W orld P E
Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia S TÆ
Zimbabwe S E
Ethiopia S EThird World S T ÆThird World S TAfrica P TÆ
Critiques of the rationale for local government
Author Country
Faniran and Areola 1976 Nigeria
Fombad 1991 Cameroon
Gasper 1991 Zimbabwe
Mawhood 1983 Africa
Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991B Zimbabwe
de Valk 1990B Zimbabwe
P-S T-E
p E
P E
P TIE
P TÆ
S E
P ElT
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The history of African local government
Author CountryBatley 1991 AfricaKasfir 1988 Africa
Mawhood 1983 Africa
Mawhood 1987 Third World
Molebatsi 1990 Botswana
Mutahaba 1989 Third World
Samoff 1989 Tanzania
P-S T-E
S TÆ
S E
P E
P TÆ
S E
S TÆ
S E
Local government efficiency and technical performance
Author
Egner 1987
Gasper 1990
HeImsing and Wekwete 1988
HeImsing 1991A
HeImsing 1991B
Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991B
Nkya 1991
Olowu and Smoke 1992
Sikabanze 1990
Sterkenburg 1990
Tordoff 1988
Country
Botswana
Botswana
Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe
Tanzania
Africa
Zambia
Botswana
Botswana
P-S T-E
S E
P E
P E
P E
P E
p E
P TÆ
P E
P E
P E
P E
Local government policy
Author Country P-S T-E
Covell 1980 Madagascar P E
Keller 1977 Kenya P E
Kingsland 1982 Gambia P E
Mannion and Brehony 1990 Tanzania S E
Maro 1990 Tanzania P E
Molebatsi 1990 Botswana S E
Montgomery 1972 Third World S ElT
Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991B Zimbabwe P E
Pausewang 1988 Ethiopia P E
Picard 1981 Botswana P E
Ross 1988 Africa P TÆ
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Local government policy
Author
Samoff 1979
Samoff 1983
Segodi 1990
Country
Tanzania
Tanzania
Botswana
P-S T-E
A TÆ
P TÆ
P E
Decentralisation reforms
Author Country P-S T-E
Adamolekun 1991 Africa P E
Barkan and Chege 1989 Kenya P E
Bonney 1982 Papua New Guinea P E
Conyers 1990 Third Wodd P T
Hil 1979 Tanzania P E
Kalapula 1990 Zimbabwe P E
Maro 1990 Tanzania P E
Mawhood 1974 Africa P TÆ
Mawhood 1983 Africa P T
Mawhood 1987 Third Wodd S TÆ
Mijere 1985 Zambia P TÆ
Molebatsi 1990 Botswana P E
Mutahaba 1989 Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia P E
Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991B Zimbabwe P E
Nellis and Rondinelli 1986 Third Wodd S TÆ
Picard 1980 Tanzania P E
Picard 1986 Swaziland P E
Picard 1979B Botswana P E
Rondinelli 1981 A Africa P E
Rondinelli 1981B Sudan P E
Samoff 1979 Tanzania P TÆ
Samoff 1983 Tanzania P TÆ
Samoff 1989 Tanzania P TÆ
Tordoff 1980 Ghana P E
de Valk 1990B Zimbabwe S E
de Valk 1990C Zimbabwe P TÆ
Wedin 1990 Liberia P TÆ
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Explaining centralisation
Author Country P-S T-E
Egner 1987 Botswana P E
Fowler 1991 Africa P E
HeImsing and Wekwete 1988 Zimbabwe S E
Kasfir 1983 Africa P E
Mawhood 1974 Third Wodd P TÆ
Mawhood 1983 Africa P TÆ
Mawhood 1987 Third Wodd P TÆ
Samoff 1979 Tanzania S TÆ
Samoff 1989 Tanzania S E
de Valk 1990A Zimbabwe P TÆ
Wunsch and Olowu 1990 Africa P TÆ
Bonney 1982 Papua New Guinea S E
Hil 1979 Tanzania S E
Mawhood 1983 Third Wodd P TÆ
Olowu and Smoke 1992 Africa S E
Picard 1979A Botswana P E
Picard 1979B Botswana S E
Samoff 1989 Tanzania P E
Donors ' ro le in decentralisation
Author Country P-S T-E
Fowler 1991 Africa S E
Kalapula 1990 Zimbabwe S E
Lindgren 1991 Zimbabwe P E
Sikabanze 1990 Zambia S E
Wedin 1990 Liberia P E
Research priorities
Author Country P-S T-S
Adamolekun 1991 Africa S E
Batley 1991 Africa P TÆ
Conyers 1984 Commonwealth P T
Conyers 1986 Third Wodd P T
Lee-Smith and Stren 1991 Third Wodd P TÆ
Naustdalslid 1991 Third Wodd P T
Nkya 1991 Tanzania S T
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4. Concluding remarks
The authors apply a huge variety of theoretical perspectives, methodologies and
data. It is beyond the scope of a bibliography to develop a systematie presentation
and discussion of these approaches. However, some basic distinctions should be
made.
Some authors understand the role of local governments and attempts to develop
them primarily as a political issue and can be distinguished from others who
emphasise non-political and technical design problems. Samoff, Mawhood, and
Wedin base their writings on the assumption that the centralisation or
decentralisation processes are strongly influenced by how powerful actors see their
power enhanced or reduced thereby. Mutizwa-Mangiza, HeImsing and to some
extent Rondinelli consider decentralisation as an attempt to make the governmental
system more efficient, and they place less emphasis on the political aspects of
decentralisation.
Another distinction can be made between a doctrinal approach and a critical
approach. The doctrinal approach tends to assume that decentralisation is
inherently positive and should be promoted whenever possible. The critical
approach sees decentralisation of government as a process that wil promote some
values and interests to the detriment of others. The question is therefore what
values should be promoted. Surprisingly many authors tend towards the doctrinal
approach.
Another distinction is between those who look at the needs of the local
communities and how can a decentralised system may best meet these needs, and
those who look at state objectives for local government and how these objectives
can be met. Most authors write within a statist perspective. Considering that the
justification for decentralisation is the promotion and acceleration of local
development processes and participation, it is striking that so few choose the needs
of the local community as their points of departure (cp. Lee-Smith and Stren 1991)
Seen in total, the literature is characterised by a vague and general conceptual
framework. Decentralisation is a relational concept, relative to a previous state of
centralisation, which may var across cases in both degree and form. Comparisons
and measurements are difficult to make. The concept of decentralisation remains
very wide as it inc1udes a huge variety of forms, objectives and degrees. This is
likely to be a reason for why there are very few instances of controversy and
debate in the field. There are no competing "schools" that contest each other and
there are very few critiques of the research and models of others. In as far as
scientific progress depends on c1ear statements, debate and controversy, this is
perhaps indicative of the state of the art in this field of research.
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5. Introduction to selected items
Adamolekun, L.: Promoting African Decentralization, in Public Administration
and Development, vol. 11, no. 3, 1991, pp. 285-292.
Decentralisation reforms in SSA have in practice become deconcentration efforts,
even if deconcentration has allowed for some controlled consultation of the local
population. The reforms have resulted in mixed achievements, and the principal
problems have been: (1) The one-pary system, which monopolises political power,
and is cautious about delegating real dec is ion making power; (2) Financial
weakesses. Due to financial shortages, the local governments are of ten unable to
perform the delegated functions; (3) Inadequate revenue yields. The financial
weakess is aggravated by inadequate local capacity and authority to collect
revenues; (4) Central expenditure control. The transfer of responsibilities is often
too limited, and central controlover expenditure decisions often remains strong.
In light of these general problems, research should focus on alleviating the
financial weakesses. This implies examination of local government income and
expenditure and on how to expand financial resources and strengthen financial
control. There is also a need to examine how local officials can be made more
sensitive to local needs by means of training.
Akpan, P.: Local Government Structure as a Spatial Framework for Rural
Development in Nigeria, in Public Administration and Development, voL. 10,
no. 3, 1990, pp. 263-276.
Akpan argues that rural development, a priority objective in Nigeria, depends on
suitable administrative structures, not the least local government structures. He
gives an historical overview of the development of such structures in Nigeria, and
argues that the decentralisation reform of 1976 did not include the political and
administrative arrangements that are necessary for locally driven rural develop-
ment. More specifically, he argues that the sub-national levels of government
should organise the present vilage structure in the countryside, encourage local
popular paricipation, utilise traditional leadership and loyalties, improve
integration between various sub-national leve Is in the government hierarchies,
allow the local governments to engage in both service provision and productive
development, and finally, integrate initiatives and policies launched at various
hierarchical levels in the country. He argues for a national hierarchy of many
leveIs, for which division of work as well as integration are important objectives.
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Areola, O. and A. Faniran: The Concept of Resources and Resource Utilzation
among Local COffmunities in Western State (Nigeria), in African Environment,
voL. 2, no. 3, 1976, pp. 39-51.
It is often contended that planners are indifferent to people's needs and ignorant
of local circumstances. Many argue that it is urgent to give the local population
power over local development, in order to ensure that projects are based on
accurate and relevant knowledge about local resources. This study has examined
what local communities knew about the natural resources in their area.
It was found that people knew much about the resources they were actually using.
The local communities had only vague knowledge about the potentials of untapped
resources, they were partially negative to new resource uses, and in some cases
they held unrealistically positive expectations. However, people were wiling to
engage in common projects locally, provided it gave immediate benefits for the
local community.
There is a need for local authorities and elected leadership to organise and develop
local resource uses. The local government of the community was found to be
incapable in this respect. Strengthening and developing the local government is
needed for the local authorities to play such an innovative, planning and
developmental role.
Aziegbe, S.A.: The Paradox of Creating a Special Agency for Rural Development
in Nigeria. Paper presented for the XVth. World Congress of International
Political Science Association, Buenos Aires, July 21-25, 1991.
Nigeria has long neglected development of the rural areas, and policies were
biased towards the urban areas. A directorate with the task of promoting rural
development was set up in 1986 as a semi-independent development authority. It
engaged in numerous projects, and its performance was generally disappointing.
Problems of poor implementation, missing infrastructure to support projects,
inadequate training efforts and generally poor technical quality in construction
works were pointed out as indications of poor performance.
The directorate was not linked to local governments or other channels for
participation. In fact, it duplicated local government in many areas. Projects were
not based on felt needs and met with indifference. Maintenance was lacking and
technologies were not appropriate for the users. The author conc1udes that local
governments should have a larger role to play, as they promise to ease these
problems related to participation, not the least maintenance needs.
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Barkan, J. and M. Chege.: Decentralizing the State: District Focus and the
Politics of Re-Al1ocation in Kenya, in Journal of Modern African Studies, voL.
27, no. 3, 1989, pp. 431-453.
Based on the Kenyan experience, the authors seek out the possibilities and limits
of decentralisation. Central control in policy making suffers from the main
weakesses of poor information about local circumstances, shortages of resources
and capacity and weak mobilisation and support among target groups. These
problems can only be alleviated by means of popular paricipation in planning and
implementation. Popular participation depends on relatively autonomous 10calleve1
institutions with resources and leadership, enabling them to enter into a
bargainingprocess with the central state. The outcome of such a bargaining
relationship would be a balance between national goals and local needs. The
obstac1es to decentralisation derive from the center's unwillngness to give away
power and from the huge resource needs of the expanded local institutions.
Decentralisation in Kenya under President Moi resulted less from bureaucratic
initiatives to improve administrative efficiency than from the President' s need to
restructure the regime's political base. The reforms were in essence aimed at
winding down the c1ientilist structure of the former Kenyatta regime, and to build
a new base comprising the regions and ethnic groups supporting Moi. This was
done by strengthening the district administration by providing it with resources and
decision making power. The outcome was not the firm controlover these powers
by the local population,. but more of a reshuffe of power within the state
machinery. The proportion of resources channelled to the districts remained very
small. The decentralisation reform was determined not by ideas on how
development might be accelerated, but by power holders wishing to distribute and
consolidate power.
Batley, R.: The Role of Local Government in Development, in J. Naustdalslid
(ed.): Local Government and Development. Workshop on Local Government
and Development, NIBR, Oslo, 1991.
The disappointing results of the centralised system introduced in most Sub-Sahara
African countries after independence have led to new interest in local government
or privatisation, not the least encouraged by donors. New policy principles, like
basic needs, sustainability and accountability, did also lead to a new focus on
decentralisation. Decentralisation is expected to facilitate resource mobilisation,
local adjustment, utilisation oflocal knowledge, improved accountability, improved
coordination and finally, improved balance between investment and recurrent costs.
On the other hand, there is stil a need for national integration and for control of
poorly performing local units and their expenditure.
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The author singIes out the need for improved local government effectiveness as
a main challenge for research on local government. InstItutional arangements wil
determine the effectiveness and co st efficiency of performance. Research should
focus on institutional factors such as formal structures, accountability and
responsiveness, leadership and strategy, coordination, finances, staff and finally,
the relationship to the private sector. Research should examine how these factors
are related to efficiency and performance.
Bird, R.: A New Look at Indirect Taxation in Developing Countries, in World
Development, voL. 15, no. 9, 1987, pp. 1151-1161.
This artic1e is a contribution to the renewed debate about the merits of direct
versus indirect taxation in LDCs. Bird' s main argument is that indirect taxation
may be more promising than many realise. Indirect taxation dominates in LDCs
because of insufficient administrative capacity to undertake direct taxation and
because of the informal nature of the economy. In general, indirect taxation
increases in importance the less developed a country or a region is. The exact
form of indirect taxation systems vary substantially. There is a lack of research on
how taxation systems influence a whole range of social and economic concerns.
Knowledge is needed in order to develop better systems, not the least in order to
create viable local governments. It is particularly important that taxation systems
are adjusted to the often ignored variations among the poor citizens.
Bonney, N.: Local Government and Political Development in Papua New Guinea,
in Public Administration and Development, voL. 2, no. 2, 1982, pp. 113-127.
What are the prospects for local government in Papua New Guinea? The author
answers by outlining the historical development of local government in Papua New
Guinea. It was imposed as an alien structure by the Australian colonial authorities.
In some parts local government was met with initial enthusiasm, which faded as
few benefits were forthcoming. In more advanced areas it met with resistance as
the localleaders saw it as an imperialist structure. However, the local government
model gave the first introduction to large scale political organisation, which
facilitated the anti-colonialist opposition movement. Ultimately, this movement
gained independence, but remained fragmented and linked to strong regions. After
independence, policies of far-reaching devolution to the provinces were effected,
which weakened the central state. Provincial government was based on the district
levellocal government model that once triggered the anti-colonialist movement.
The prospects for the original district based local government are poor. District
government is substituted by provincial government, discredited as a colonial
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means of repression, and ignored by the local people as it consistently failed to
deliver services.
Conyers, D.: Decentralization and Development: a Review of the Literature, in
Public Administration and Development, voL. 4, no. 2, 1984, pp. 187-197.
Conyers deals with local government research in Commonwealth countries. After
a huge interest in local government around 1960, a centralisation period followed,
which was again replaced by a renewed interest in local government in the 1970s.
Four topics have received paricular scholarly attention: (1) The concept of
decentralisation; (2) The role of decentralisation in development; (3) The various
organisational models of a decentralised structure, e.g. legal framework, division
of work within and between 1evels, coordination and financing; and (4) Monitoring
and evaluation of local governments.
She argues that there has been too few evaluations of local government, that their
effects go largely unexamined and that comparisons in particular are missing. A
lot of relevant knowledge might exist under different headings, Le. integrated rural
development, community development, participation, regional planning, rural
development and organisational design. As relevant knowledge is also acquired in
many different disciplines, there is an obvious need to compile and link knowledge
from these diverse sources.
Conyers, D.: Future Directions in Development Studies: the Case of
Decentralization, in World Development, voL. 4, no. 5, 1986, pp. 593-603.
Three general problems for development research apply as well to research on
local government in LDCs: (1) Language. Many concepts and are unclear and
understood differently in different contexts. Many of the concepts are also very
value-laden, like the term decentralisation itself. (2) Theory and practice. Pure
academic research is often irrelevant because the academic is not familiar with
local circumstances. W orse stil, academics operate with strict distinctions and
criteria and tend to become pessimistic about Africa's prospects. Their research
is simply not constructive. Examples inc1ude decentralisation studies, which
mistake rhetorics for operational goals and describe reforms as failures, being
unable to see the progress that is after all being made. (3) Substantive differences.
Within some disciplines, the differences between the Western world and Africa is
too heavily emphasised. One consequence is that all theoretical and methodo-
logical insights are seen as being Western and therefore as irrelevant. The
emphasis on this distinction blurs the fact that decentralisation varies both within
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the Western world and within the Third World. It seems somewhat arbitrar to
make this distinction more critical than other distinctions.
There is a need for more detail ed and balanced studies that should focus on
context, on what decentralisation was intended to achieve, and who benefitted
therefrom. There is a need to clarify concepts and to strive for a unified theory.
Conyers, Do: Centralization and Development Planning: A Comparative Perspec-
tive, in P de Valk and K.H. Wekwete (eds.): Decentralizing for Participatory
Planning. Aldershot/rookfield: Avebury, 1990.
Conyers discusses first dimensions of decentralisation and then problems of
decentralisation. Decentralisation is often categorised according to degree, where
devolution, delegation, and deconcentration are forms of decreasing degree. But
each of these forms may vary on crucial dimensions: (1) What activities are
transferred? A distinction can be made between routine matters and developmental
planning. (2) What types of decisions are transferred? Policy makng involves
many types of decisions, and it may var what decisions are transferred. Typically
allocation of funds and control in person neI matters are not transferred to any
significant extent. (3) To whom are decision-making powers transferred? It makes
a difference whether such powers are transferred to local MPs, chiefs or repre-
sentative elected councils. (4) What form of power is transferred? The power
transfer itself may take many forms. It may be judicial, administrative, or political.
These forms are not equally stable and robust.
Decentralisation reforms often encounter a combination of the three following
problems: (1) Design problems. The reform itself is not well prepared, it is of ten
based on vague concepts, and support is often missing. (2) Implementation
problems. Clear responsibilties, capacity, bureaucratic acceptance and resources
are often missing and undermine implementation. (3) Impact. The fate of
decentralisation reforms depends on their success, and local governments have
often been abolished based on assertions of poor performance. But it is difficult
to evaluate the results of decentralisation. Many problems in local governments are
not caused by decentralisation but by more general administrative, economic and
developmental factors.
Covell, M.: Who Governs in Fianarantsoa? Political Interaction in a Malagasy
Town, in Journal of African Studies, voL. 7, no. 3, 1980, pp. 152-160.
The author analyses the relationship between population and government
authorities in a Malagasy town. She finds that the relationship is characterised by
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poor communication between the two. Contrary to what is often assumed, this has
not led to opposition in the population or to complaints among officials that the
local people do not contribute and play their role.
The government authorities prefer a minimum of political activism because they
do not have the resources that would be needed to respond. Neither do they have
resources to launch initiatives that might depend on target group cooperation. The
local people are organised in voluntar associations and in neighbourhood councils
which do not eng age in interest articulation against the local governmental
authorities. The reasons are that policies are not decided locally, but nationally.
Local level officials are not sensitive to local needs. Policies are only rarely
implemented. The population is consequently ignorant about what the government
does. The local associations and neighbourhood councils function as buffers
between people and government and as substitutes for the government. The people
and the government are weaky integrated and both have an interest in the
continuation of this weak relationship. The leadership of the associations and
neighbourhood councils are oriented towards the status quo, their position depend
on their function as buffers, and they act according to paternalistic attitudes that
restrict political activism.
Davey, K.: Financing Regional Government. International Practices and their
Relevance for the Third World. New York: John Wiley, 1983.
The main theme in this book is how the activities of sub-national units should be
financed in LDCs. The author distinguishes between five main types of functions
that might be delegated to sub-national units: service provision, regulatory
functions, development, representation, and coordination and planning. The main
types of funding systems are: Central government allocations, taxation, user fees,
loans and enterprise. Each of these are divided in to several sub-types. By financing
systems are meant the ways functions are linked to various types of funding. There
is no objectively best way to organise financing. Any type of financing must be
evaluated in light of the following main criteria: (1) Reasonable administrative
costs as compared to incomes; (2) justice, as this is understood in different
cultures; (3) administrative feasibility; and (4) political feasibility. The au thor
discusses various taxation systems extensively in the light of these criteria.
A financing system can be linked to great autonomy for the sub-nationalleve1, or
to the opposite. The scope of activities and the proportion of public spending in
themselves are no measures of decentralisation. The discretion allowed for local
government in how to solve tasks and how to spend resources for this purpose is
the critical variable. Wide scope and sufficient resources are necessary, but not
sufficient conditions for local autonomy.
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The author concludes that no arangement can be adjusted to all values and
considerations. Any arrangement wil maximise some values to the detriment of
others. The choIce is political. It is not easy to predict how most arangements wil
influence issues and values.
Egner, Bo: The District Councils and Decentralization. 1978-1986. Report to
SIDA, Gaborone, 1987.
Egner gives a detailed overview of the district leve! institutions in Botswana, and
discusses whether they have the capacity that justifies further devolution.
Generally, the system is characterised by centralisation. Projects and plans depend
on ministerial approval, personneI matters are centralised to a national man power
service, and the districts are dependent on the central state for funds. The
justification for centralisation has been the poor performance of the councils.
However, throughout the 1980s, the manpower situation has improved, and the
training of personneI has also greatly improved. There are stil shortcomings, but
the central state's reluctance to devolve responsibilities to the councils cannot be
justified by referring to weak capacity.
Low implementation rates for the district councils are not explained on ly by
capacity weaknesses in the districts, but also by the central bureaucracies'
inadequate role in district council projects. The district councils' planning of
projects and their implementation are made very difficult by the central
bureaucracies': (1) Reluctance to inform about implementation targets; (2)
withholding of money that should be disbursed to councils; (3) slowapproval
processes concerning project approval and fund releases; (4) insistence on deciding
issues that legally should be left to the councils' discretion; (5) detailed
regulations of how money is spent in various projects. The councils' contribution
under the drought relief emergency programs ilustrated that there is a capacity in
the districts. There is a need to strengthen training further, to develop
administrative infrastructure, to improve administrative routines and accounting.
But the mixed implementation performance stems not only from these problems.
Fombad, CoMo: The Scope for Uniform National Law in Cameroon, in Journal
of Modern African Studies, voL. 29, no. 3, 1991, pp. 443-456.
The development of a well-functioning state depends on national standardisation
of the laws and their application. In former colonies, this means that the legal
inheritance from the former colonial power and the indigenous legal traditions
must be harmonised. This is a very complex task, because the indigenous
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standards vary, and in many countries, more than one colonial power have ruled,
and the imported legal traditions are therefore inconsistent on many points.
The development of these different legal bases into a national framework depends
on a judicial professional training that takes due account of all the existing
traditions. It furthermore depends on systematic gathering of knowledge about the
various legal systems as well as their application. Both the training and the
systematie analysis are often missing in many countries, creating large problems.
Not least the indigenous legal traditions are often ignored in judicial training.
Fowler, A.: The Role of NGOs in Changing State-Society Relations: Perspectives
from Eastern and Southern Africa, in Development Policy Review, voL. 9, no.
1, 1991, pp. 53-84.
NGOs are often singled out as crucial for the development of local self govern-
ment. NGOs may supplement local public organisations, and they are important
components in civil society, which is a precondition for real democratic debate.
However, they are seldom allowed to take up these functions. Fowler examines
how NGOs represent a threat to most African regimes, which pre vent their
development. The regimes' very basic interests in hegemony,security, autonomy,
legitimation and revenue are at stake when NGOs grow strong. Fowler elaborates
on why NGOs wil often be dangerous to regimes as they threaten such basic
interests. Regimes attempt to control NGOs by means of legislation, administrative
cooptation and political appropriation. Donor assistance to NGOs is a delicate
matter. It might strengthen the challengers, as state officials see it. It might also
create centralisation and donor dependencies among the NGOs, and undermine
their role as people's organisations.
Gasper, D.: Development Planning and Decentralization in Botswana, in P. de
Valk and K.H. Wekwete (eds.): Decentralizing for Participatory Planning?
Aldershot/rookfield: A vebury, 1990.
Gasper reviews the development of the sub-national (i.e. District) planning system
in Botswana. He emphasises that the district planning system was intended to be
a component of the national planning system, administered by the Ministry of
Finance and Development Planning. The principal actors in the sub-national
planning system are elected councils, field branches of sectoral ministries, to some
extent Land Boards, and the prefectorial District Administration. The planning
process is run by a District Development Committee where all these organs are
represented under the leadership of the District Administration.
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The design of programmes and projects is mainly left to the nationallevel
institutions, and the local organs initiate and plan only a small part of local
projects. District planning means mostly that these district actors coordinate and
plan the implementation of projects, and that they give some feed back and input
to the. national planning structure. Coordination in the districts works relatively
well due to their small proportions. This facilitates informal and smooth
coordination. Dedicated staff is also important. District planning is increasingly
considered as relevant input for national planning and local actors have been given
increased scope for decision makng about initiation and design of projects, but it
is still mainly a deconcentrated system.
Gasper, D.: Decentralizing of Planning and Administration in Zimbabwe, in
HeImsing, Mutizwa-Mangiza, Gasper et al.: Limits to Decentralization in
Zimbabwe Essays on the Decentralization of Government and Planning in the
1980s. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies, 1991.
Gasper' s point of departure is the widespread belief that decentralisation can solve
almost any problem in African societies. Very of ten analyses are designed as an
examination of how decentralised a local government system really is, and it is
normally concluded that there is not enough decentralisation. The reasons are then
found in the many centralising forces. But what decentralisation can actually
achieve and what a proper measure of decentralisation is, is seldom c1arified.
Among the many conceptual problems in the decentralisation literature is that
decentralisation implies many dilemmas, and decentralisation is not always
positive for all values. Some points can be made: (1) Decentralisation often
reduces equity because local governments are easily captured by local elites. (2)
Decentralisation is said to increase efficiency and effectiveness, but it often
remains undefined what efficiency and effectiveness is. Clientilism often increases
under decentralised systems, and that hardly increases efficiency. (3) Decentralisa-
tion is by many seen as a contribution to growth, but the kind of growth and
development that is expected is of ten poorly defined. (4) Decentralisation is
justified by the need for coordination. But decentralisation does not necessarily
solve coordination problems. On the contrary, it might make them worse simply
because the number of actors is higher. (5) It is of ten not very clearly defined why
participation is so important. Is it to reach consensus or to find better technical
solutions, or is it a good thing in itself? (6) Decentralisation normally aims at both
improving administrative standards and paricipation. These two objectives are
often inconsistent with each other. (7) What contributes to national integration ?
This value is used as argument both for and against decentralisation.
The phenomenon called decentralisation is complex and varied, and is used in so
many contexts that it is problematie to cover all with a single concept. However,
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some general tendencies can be identified: (1) States decentralise when they feel
secure or when they are short of resources. (2) Decentralisation is normally
combined with strong state presence in the districts. (3) Decentralisation is of ten
used as a means to spread the blame for the state of things. (4) Decentralised
systems are so complex that they normally lead to conflcts and different inter-
pretations. (5) Decentralisation is controversial because it affects the balance of
power. DecentralIsation is always shaped by political forces, being a matter of
political power.
HeImsing, S.H.Jo and K.Ho Wekwete: Financing District Councils in Zimbabwe,
in Planning and Administration, voL. 15, no. 2, 1988, pp. 20-29
The authors attempt to highlight problems of linking local government
responsibilities with adequate resources. In general, there must a fair match
between tasks and resources. Local revenue generation has a potential, and it can
take many forms such as taxation and fees, income generating activities, and loans.
But even if this potential is better utilised, there wil be a need for central grants.
Furthermore, there are several reasons why a substantial par of the local budgets
should be financed through central grants: (1) It facilitates the necessary amount
of control. (2) Local and nationalorgans are parts of the same overall system, and
should function within common priorities and plans. (3) Central allocations com-
pensate for regional differences. (4) Central grants may take many forms and do
not necessarily imply detailed central control. It is crucial that they are organised
in ways that allow for some local discretion on how they should be used.
The Zimbabwean experience started in 1980 with a grave imbalance among local
communities along racial lines. This is stil the case. But the dependence on the
central government has been slightly decreased. The districts vary according to
their ab il it y to mobilse resources locally, even if the sources of revenue have
increased in number. Local government spending has increased, but expectations
have increased even more. Key challenges are to improve the local ability to raise
revenue, to ensure equity in the distribution of resources, and to design a system
for central government grants that allow more local diseretion.
HeImsing, AoH.J.: Survey of District Income Generating Activities, in N.
Mutizwa-Mangiza and A.HJ. HeImsing: Rural Development and Planning in
Zimbabwe. Aldershot/Brookfield: A vebury, 1991 A.
The author examines the potential of local government enterprises as income
generators. The results have often been disappointing. The author presents a survey
of such activities in Zimbabwean local government. Income generating activities
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are those that the private sec tor would normally engage in, and there might be
competition from market actors.
Income Generating Projects (IGP) have a lon g history in Zimbabwe. The colonial
powers financed urban local administration by local government monopoly on beer
trading, housing and services. One underlying purpose was to block the Africans
in their economic advaneement. In the survey, liqueur undertakings dominate, but
there are also others. The typical problems are that IGPs run up deficits and
create relatively few jobs. The local administrations' management of the IGPs is
weak in many cases. The profitability is often lower than in comparable private
enterprises. Most IGPs require very specialised and dedicated man power that local
governments do not have at their disposal. Local governments have problems
funding the necessar investments. In conclusion, there is not a very large
potential for local governments' IGP, and they are too demanding in terms of
funds and expertise. For those already in operation, the challenge is to improve
management.
HeImsing, A.HoJ.: Transforming Rural Local Government; Zimbabwe's Post-
Independence Experience, in N. Mutizwa-Mangiza and A.HJ. HeImsing: Rural
Development and Planning in Zimbabwe. Aldershot/rookfield: Avebury,
1991B.
The local government structure of Zimbabwe was inherited from the apartheid
regime, and a critical challenge has been to remove the discrimination against the
majority of the population. This discrimination was buIlt into the dual
governmental structure of separate and privileged Rural Councils for the white
communities. They enjoyed substantial autonomy and resources, and they delivered
a variety of services and planning functions. They ran their black townships of
workers as self-financing entities, based on incomes from housing, beer sales and
the like. The local authorities in the rest of the country were strictly controlled by
the District Commssioner, had weak administrations, few resources and performed
few functions.
In the first years after independence, the aim was to help District Councils catch
up with Rural Councils. This did not succeed in terms of resource provision. Since
1988 the amalgamation of the two types of councils has been sought, but the
effective implementation has been slow or absent, and the Rural Councils still
function as separate entities.
Hil, F.: Administrative Decentralization for Development, Participation, and
Control in Tanzania, in Journal of African Studies, voL. 6, no. 4, 1979, pp. 182-
192.
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Hil examines the i 972 decentralisation reform in Tanzania. The reform aimed at
increasing administrative efficiency and coordination, and popular participation.
The author shows that these objectives were not achieved, mainly because the
regime' s need for controlover society and over the administration led to only
partial and inadequate implementation of the reform. The reform provided an
opportunity for the regime to send oppositional civil servants to the regions in
order to break up the administrative unit y and hierarchy that threatened the party
leadership's control. The new structure was marked by confusion, I.e. unclear
division of work within and between national and regionalleveIs. One reason was
that Nyerere intended to keep the bureaucracy in a state of flux and thus prevent
it from unified action, another reason was the party' s inability to fil the key role
as coordinator and creator of policy guidelines. The ei vil servants added to this
confusion as this was a functional way to spread responsibility and avoid criticism.
Participation could have been improved by strengthening the district councils
which were organs for local interest articulation. Because of fear of opposition, the
regime abandoned these councils, substituted them with appointed party officials,
and thus reduced the channels for paricipation.
In short, the decentralisation reform was shaped by the regime' s desire for control,
which blocked paricipation and effective administration. The problems of
administrative performance are not related to decentralised structures in particular.
They derive from administrative weakness and from tensions between the
bureaucracy and the political leadership. These issues are not specific to
decentralised structures.
Kalapula, E.S.: Approaches to Sub-National Planning and the Changing Planning
Environment in Zambia, in A.HJ. HeImsing and K.H. Wekwete (eds): Sub-
National Planning in Southern and Eastern Africa. Approaches, Finances and
Education. Aldershot/rookfield: Avebury, 1990.
A main objective for the Zambian strategy for sub-national development has be en
to compensate for the regional imbalances left by the colonial power. The focus
of this article is on the various planning approaches that have been applied since
independence to implement this strategy.
The First National Development Plan (FNDP) channelled extra resources to the
least developed regions. Planning and coordination of policy and specific programs
were largely left to the centralleveL. Sub-national development commttees and
elected councils had a responsibility to plan and coordinate the implementation,
and to formulate regional development programmes. The results were that the
weakest provinces did not have the capacity to implement much of what was
proposed, and the imbalances remained largely unchanged. The Second National
Development Plan (SNDP) continued the strategy but established planning units
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in each province, and emphasised integrated planning of implementation and local
inputs to the nationalleveL. But policy decisions remained in the central head
quarters. Participation was also sought to be strengthened as a device for
consultation. Only in the Third National Development Plan was devolution put on
the agenda. The provinces should now also be allowed to initiate and plan their
own projects, and the elected organs for popular consultation were further
developed.
However, the contextual conditions for sub-national planning have deteriorated.
The financial crisis has made planning and active public policy diffcult in general.
The country has increasingly become dependent on donors, not the least in the
important agricultural sector. Donors consequently dominate the planning of public
policy. Initiation, design and implementation of projects are in their hands, and the
scope for recipient planning and coordination is limited, not the least at the district
level.
Kasfir, N.: The Origins of Local Government, in: P. Mawhood: Government in
the Third World. The Experience of Tropical Africa. New York, Toronto: John
Wiley, 1983.
Kasfir discusses historical reasons for the abolition of local governments in most
African countries. Local governments in anglophone Africa were mainly created
by the British before independence as a means for the pursuit of colonial
objectives. Such objectives were to create an efficient sub-national administration,
to prov ide an arena (and a distraction) for the educated and politically activated
social groups, and to prep are for independence in the long run. Development was
not a goal, the ambition was rather to train the people in management until they
would be in charge themselves. This limited democracy would be a rather
controlled and guided exercise that would not allow any uncontrolled actions. The
key objective was training. Still, the limited participation that was allowed was
used by the emerging nationalists for popular mobilisation.
Local government had been the arena where the winning nationalist factions had
fought their battles against other factions, and they were naturally afraid that
loosing factions might use these arenas for the same purpose, in particular
oppositional chiefs. Local governments were thus abolished. Other factors as well
made it rational for the new regimes to roll back local government such as the
following: (1) The new leaders acted not only within the modern state system, but
also within a paralleI, traditional system of elan or ethnic loyalty, characterised by
patron-c1ient relationships. The new regimes withdrew resources from local
government to dispose of in patron-client relationships. (2) The colonial local
government set-up was discredited. (3) The colonial local government had an
authoritarian structure, and as this attitude stil prevailed after independence, local
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government was seen as inadequate for the tasks of the new states. 4. Many
African countries were too poor to finance local government. (5) Trained
personneI was scarce and it was not possible to fil alllocal government positions.
(6) Strong beliefs among regime leaders in central planning and strategic use of
scarce resources. (7) In some countries, important ambitions of socialist
transformation. (8) Fear of opposition.
Keller, Eo: Harambee! Educational Policy, Inequality, and the Political Economy
of Rural Community Self-Help in Kenya, in Journal of African Studies, voL. 4,
no. 1, 1977, pp. 86-106.
The author examnes the floUfishing self-help movement in Kenya, and discusses
its potential to contribute to the development of the country. The self-help
movement means that rural communities mobilise traditional leadership and
organisation in order to initiate, fund, implement and maintain development
projects of various kinds, not the least secondary schools. Eventually, the state
may take over the responsibilty for such assets, but not automatically.
The problem has been that self-help projects are conceived of from a very narrow
conception of community needs. Society at large and other communities are only
considered as far as they may prov ide additional resources. The regime as well as
the national administration have been reluctant to coordinate and control the self-
help movement out of fear of social unrest. The consequence is that these local
efforts have not been adjusted to actual education needs, national policies, standard
of services and implications for recurrent costs. Furthermore, they enhance rather
than address inequalities as the most prosperous communities are those best able
to launch self-help projects. There is thus a need to maintain the movement, but
to coordinate it better with the enforcement of national policy guidelines.
Kingsland, Jo: Resource Allocation Decisions in Gambian Local Councils, in The
Journal of Developing Areas, voL. 16, no. 2, 1982, pp. 213-232.
This analysis discusses the issue of influence in Gambian local government
councils. Behaviour in council meetings is assumed to be guided by a number of
decision makng rules (how to act in various situations) and decision making
criteria (what are relevant premises and values in a decision). In the councils local
chiefs, elected councilors, executive officers, and the area (district) commissioner
are represented. Kingsland finds that the commissioner has the largest influence.
Because of his superior knowledge of the system in general, his professional
expertise and his ability to switch between languages, rules and criteria his
judgements prevail in most cases. Furthermore, he is the interpreter of the rules
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and he is thus able to manipulate the rules whereas chiefs and councilors are
constrained by them.
A sec ond issue is to what extent are dec is ion making rules and criteria determined
by local culture? Kingsland assumes that decision making rules and criteria may
stem from individual characteristics, group norms and processes (i.e. the council),
organisational setting, and the environment. The author conc1udes that in the
councils he studied, decision makng rules and criteria stem to a great extent from
the environment (societal needs, the central state's demands and the options for
external funding), and from the group processes (characterised by the
commissioner' s superior knowledge of the governmental system and of languages,
which was used to manipulate decisions). The organisation as such was the source
of few rules and criteria. These decision makng rules and criteria tended to
constrain the role played by chiefs and elected councilors, the bearers of local
culture and values. In fact, local culture of consensus-seeking and respect for
authority tend to give the commissioner an even more predominant ro1e. The rules
of the local political processes are those given by the central state and by the
competence and knowledge of its local representative, the commissioner.
Lee-Smith, D. and R. Stren: New Perspectives on African Urban Management,
in Environment and Urbanization, voL. 3, no. 1, 1991, pp. 23-36.
Research on urban management has of ten chosen as its point of deparure what the
problems are as seen from the state's perspective and what the state can do to
solve them. As many states are forced to reduce their activities, it is even more
important to choose the urban society itself as the point of departure, to ask what
its needs are, how they can be met, and finally, how the state can contribute to
finding solutions.
Urban societies are complex, but four important dimensions are pointed out by the
authors: (1) The urban areas have experienced a cut-back in resource allocations,
per capita public spending has been very much reduced, but there is no large
urban bias. The urban areas are c10sely linked to the rural economy, and spending
in the cities wil have wider repercussions than what is often recognised. (2) The
in formal sector is almost the only growing African sec tor. Even though informal
organisation of economic activities avoids costs of formality, there are also costs
of informal organisation, like uncertainty, lack of services and infrastructure and
the fact that the informal sec tor is not much considered in development planning
and physical planning. (3) The informal sector has a large proportion of women,
and the needed support to this sec tor has to consider this fact. (4) As seen from
the local level of urban societies, the problem is poor access to services and
inadequate infrastructure.
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The crucial problem is of ten that the state is hostile to the informal economic
sector, and thus overlooks the potential of this sector. The state is not the sole
provider of relevant services. There is a huge community of various local
organisations and NGOs that fil important roles. The state cannot replace them,
but possibly play a supporting role There is a need for more research on the
community organisations, on the interplay between community organisations,
NGOs, enterprises, local government and the informal economy. There is a need
to examine how this parly informal structure is related to the state and how these
relations can be improved for the benefit of urban development.
Lindgren, L.: Can Development Assistance Improve Local Government? in 1.
Naustdalslid (ed.): Local Government and Development. Workshop on Local
Government and Development. NffR, Oslo, 1991
One of SIDA's priority objectives is the development of public administration in
recipient countries. SIDA engaged the Swedish Association of Local Authorities
(SALA) in a program aimed at the development of Zimbabwe's local government
structure. The author's main concern is the prospects for development assistance
in this field. SALA has increasingly developed a dose co operative relationship
with its national counterpart. Advice, support and consultancies have been offered.
Detailed procedures and manuals for management, planning, coordination,
budgeting and implementation are developed and training arranged for. SALA has
also advised on the proper degree of local autonomy and democratic representa-
tion, as SALA views these matters. SALA has worked from an underlying goal
structure favouring local autonomy, democratic local leadership, planning and
uniform service provision across districts. SALA/SIDA have succeeded in
introducing improved management and planning techniques, and in training
officials in their application. However, the objectives of SALA also relate to the
distribution of power and resources in Zimbabwe, and these problems have proved
to be beyond the reach of a donor. The more basic political preconditions for local
government are difficult to address in donor projects.
Mannion, J. and E. Brehony: Projects of the People or for the People: A Look
at Vilagers Participation in three Projects in two Vilages in Tanzania, in
Public Administration and Development, voL. 10, no. 2, 1990, pp. 165-178.
This study examines the hypothesis that popular participation is a critical condition
for project success. Paricipation may be of three types. The first is labelled
empowerment, in which initiation, planning, design and implementation of projects
are decided under the control of the local community. The sec ond is labelled
community development, in which guidelines and policies are provided by actors
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outside the local community, but the latter has a say in the specific operationalisa-
tion and implementation of the policy guidelines. Third, participation may take the
form of collaboration, in which participation is reduced to the provision of
information and labour to projects decided up on and implemented under the
control of outside actors. These three types represent different paricipation
degrees.
The main findings are: The weaker the participation profie is, the less
participation there is. Those who did participate were not representative. Common
people avoided projects with a weak paricipation profie because there were
sanctions towards them if the project did not lead to expected results. In as far as
participation took place, it was marked by a concern to solve felt problems.
Participation increased if it to ok place in small groups. There is a need to organise
for participation, and to train vilage leaders in how to organise and achieve it.
Maro, PoS.: The Impact of Decentralization on Spatial Equity and Rural Develop-
ment in Tanzania, in World Development, voL. 18, no. 5, 1990, pp. 673-693.
Tanzania decentralised its governmental system in 1972, and this aricle examines
the effects of decentralisation on equity among districts and villages, and on rural
development. Concerning equity, the reform led to some improvements. The
vilages were established as the lowest governmentallevel, and service centres and
growth poles were designated for the whole country. The planning system should
now receive inputs from the lowest leve!, the vilage. Even if the impact of that
input is disputable, this reform meant that all local units were systematically
considered in the planning procedure, and localisation issues were more
systematically considered, whereas in the previous sectoral planning, localisation
was not an important premise at all. In particular, resources for health and
education projects were increasingly channelled to weaker districts after the
reform.
The local units - the vilages - should now plan for productive development. In
some vilagessuch planning took place. This planning should provide inputs to
district planning. However, the plans made in the local vilages by non-experts
were not provided in ways compatible with the planning methodology of the
district planners, and were transformed when they got to the district level.
Concerning district planning, Maro argues that this planning elaborated on how
production could be expected to develop, but it did not include measures to
influence that development.
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Mascarenhas, A.: Issues in African Rehabilitation, in African Environment, vol.
VI, no. 3-4, 1989, pp. 23-24.
The environmental problems are placed in the broader context of the African crisis
as environment al problems are c10sely related to problems of poverty and under-
development. The reasons for the crisis in general and the environmental crisis in
particular are very complex. One of them, however, is the centralisation of
decision making and implementation of public policy. Centralisation has meant
that improper technology has been transferred, costly and advanced solutions have
be en chosen, simple solutions that could have worked have not been tried out, and
drastic changes have been pursued while indigenous knowledge has not been
utilised.
A priority in the work to rehabiltate the natural resource basis in the local
communities is to enable the local people to take on this responsibility themselves.
This implies that investments must be based on peoples' needs, that decision
makng must be generally decentralised, that the poorest groups in particular are
attended to, that projects are adjusted to local ecologies and to existing farming
systems, that local organisational forms are utilised, and that it is recognised that
western concepts and technology have limited applicability. Local communities
would be able to achieve much if given the chance and the necessary assistance.
Mawhood, P.: Negotiating from Weakness: The Search for a Model of Local
Government in Countries of the Third World, in Planning and Administration,
voL. 1, no. 1, 1974, pp. 17-32.
Mawhood' s concern is to examine why the central state is in need of a true local
government characterised by devolution to local autonomous organisations. The
point of deparure is that there are differing interests, values and perceptions
between central government and local communities. Local governments are in-
dispensable because they are capable of bridging this gap. In a western, pluralis t
society devolution and deconcentration are alternative methods to reach the same
end; decentralised decision making. In both cases, the local community is capable
of mobilsing and influencing decisions. In LDCs this is not so. In these countries
local state officials are insensitive to local pressures, and only devolution can
facilitate reallocal influence in decision making.
The independent states throughout Africa centralised formal decision making
power soon after independence in the belief that nationalism had erased legitimate
interest differences, and that centralised, coordinated control was functional for
accelerated development. Local participation was thus blocked. The problem was
that the local communities are made of groups with their own leadership and
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distinct interests and values. Jf the state is going to act and implement policies, it
has either to cooperate with these or suppress and control them. The latter option
is beyond the resources of the post-independent states, and the former is blocked
by lack of devolution. The formal decision making structure was thus one of
centralisation while actual social power was spread across the various
communities, whose members withdrew from the centralised state because its
policies deviated from the local interests and values.
For the public sector to function properly, the channels of communication between
state and society have to be developed and improved. Only local governments with
some autonomy can fil that role. The state needs a local counterpar with whom
to negotiate. In this way the gap between central and local interests, cultures and
values can be bridged. Training, more resources and improved management
techniques cannot overcome the basic weakness of broken communication
channeIs.
The argument that devolution is only possible in well established nation states has
little merit as there are no cases of civil war or social unrest that are caused by the
local government system. Local government itself is an imported phenomenon in
rural areas, and wil not develop by itself. It has to be purposefully designed to
provide options for interest articulation while being supervised to some extent to
avoid abuses. This implies that interest conflcts have to be accepted as normal as
devolution would institutionalise the ariculation and balancing of conflicting
interests and values. Local autonomy has to be accepted as an important norm, and
this norm needs an institutional base at the centrallevel in the ministry responsible
for local government. Finally, the local government must be provided with
autonomy, resources and support.
Mawhood, P. (edo): Local Government in the Third World. The Experience of
Tropical Africa. New York, Toronto: John Wiley, 1983 (introductory and
concluding chapters).
Mawhood describes the history of local governments in Africa and argues that
local governments have been established and abolished cyclically because of a
constant tension between the state' s need for control and the need for mobilisation
and active popular participation. In most countries, local councils were part of the
colonial inheritance. They were in most cases abolished by the new independent
regimes because of regime fears about political competition. The 1960s were thus
characterised by centralised planning. The arguments in its favour were to utilise
resources effectively and to create a unified nation. The centralisation model
performed poorly, and led to a renewed interest in decentralisation in the 1970s.
Decentralisation took the form of administrative deconcentration, whereby
planning and implementation were tried to be adjusted to local needs in sub-
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national deconcentrated services. However, these systems also performed badly,
and failed to mobilise people for development purposes. A revival for devolution
is on its way.
True local government is characterised by a budget of its own, a relatively wide
scope of functions, representative decision making, separate legal existence and
ability to allocate resources. Key design problems have been how large they
should be - there is atension between the criteria of viability and legitimacy; how
strong the executive branch should be; how the financial system should be
designed; and finally, what control the councils should have in personneI matters.
Any local government is semi-dependent and useful for the state as a means of
receiving feed-back and as a means of reaching and influencing people. Control
and top-down influences predominate and the local authorities are rarely strong
enough to enter into a bargaining process which would be ideaL. The center
attempts to controllocal government in order to pursue four major interests in its
relationship to the districts; political control, economic regulation, equity and
minimum standards and administrative efficiency.
In conc1usion, a basic dilemma underlying decentralisation reforms has been how
the state could mobilse and reach people while maintaining control. The central
state pursues both objectives. The dilemma has been how to make people
participate without their also sharing power. The need for control blocks true
devolution, but the control aimed at by centralisation is also not achieved. The
state wil stil have to deal with reluctant social groups in the districts, groups with
power and upon whom the central state depends in order to implement policies.
In a centralised system, the central state has to deal with them through in formal
channeIs. Decentralisation requires central political support, resources and advice.
It requires a recognition that political conflct is normal. The local governments
need astrong institutional patron at the center. Decentralisation is important for
the state in order to have a constructive relationship to groups in society.
Mawhood, P.: Decentralization and the Third World in the 1980s, in Planning
and Administration, voL. 14, no. Spring, 1987, pp. 10-23.
The importance and forms of local government in Africa have varied substantially .
Considering its changing importance in governments ' policies, the point of
departure is the introduction of local government with some autonomy in
anglophone Africa by the British. The French preferred a prefect model. The
newly independent states abolished local governments, and the 1960s and early
1970s were marked by centralised policy makng. The problems of centralisation
led to renewed interest in decentralised government and to numerous reforms
aimed at administrative deconcentration. Political decentralisation, open to popular
participation, was not allowed. In essence, governments sought mobilisation of the
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people, but were unwiling to share political power. The consequent poor
mobilisation of loe al citizens became a problem, and the 1980s have been
characterised by a recognition that popular paricipation is necessary. These phases
reflect the various ways that states have tried to penetrate and mobilise local
communities while maintaining control.
Local governments have also varied substantially in form. Local government is a
western model that has been transformed in its meeting with the national and local
cultures, and taken specific shapes where it has been introduced. Africa's tradition
of local self-help is not found in Asia, and in African societies it also varies
greatly in strength and forms. The prospects for local government in Africa vary
greatly with the economic and political situation. National political competition
and conflct undermine the prospects. As the economic crisis forces the state to
withdraw from many fields, the room for local government is enhanced. The
prospects are also increased by the gradual political socialisation into western
models of government throughout the countries. By the end of the 1980s, these
conditions lead the author to expect expanded scope for local government.
Mijere, N.: The Mineworkers Resistance to Governmental Decentralization in
Zambia. Nation Building and Labour Aristocracy in the Third World. Thesis,
Brandeis University, 1985.
Mijere's analysis of decentralisation in Zambia is mainly concerned with what
determine the regime' sand other key actors' attItudes towards decentralisation. He
contends that political conflict and dass struggles are the key factors determining
various actors' actions in the field of decentralisation. A detailed analysis shows
how the regime until the late seventies opposed strong local governments out of
fear of opposition and fragmentation of the country, and because centralisation
offered options for clientilism. The local government inherited at independence
thus survived only a few years as truly autonomous bodies, except in the town-
ships around the Copperbelt. In the late 1970s, the issue of local government was
again on the agenda. Mijere shows how the question of decentralisation in Zambia
was understood by all participants as a question of how to allocate governmental
resources among c1ass antagonists, and of who should controllocal councils. The
dissertation shows very clearly that decentralisation is not primarily a question of
the most suitable and efficient development administration, but a process of power
and resource distribution, and of how various actors perceive their share of power
and resources increasing or decreasing as a result of reforms. In this study, the
regime and the mine workers were the main opponents, each struggling for
resources and power.
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Molebatsi, C.O.: Planning based on Consultation: Botswana's Search for
Grassroots Participation in District Planning, in A.H.J. HeImsing and K.H.
Wekwete (eds.): Sub-National Planning in Southern and Eastern Africa.
Aldershot/rookfield: Avebury, 1990.
Botswana has had popular consultation as a key principle, in paricular after 1976.
The paricipation is linked to district planning. Prior to 1976, district planning was
mainly planning of how to implement nationally decided programmes without
much participation. However, it was realised that participation could ensure
adequate information to the planners, stable local mobilsation of resources, and
it was recognised that participation was a right in itself. For consultation to be
meaningful, it has to be linked to decision making, I.e. to district planning.
Furthermore, the district planning must influence national planning. This influence
has increased in recent years. Participation is organised through elected councils
and development commttees. It is also organised as conferences, surveys, and
meetings in the traditional decision making forum, the kgotla.
The author' s main argument is that this formal structure for participation is
suitable, but the problems lie in its operation. Many civil servants are negative
about the value of consultation, and do not take it seriously. Elected councilors
often do not have much formal education, and are in a weak position in dealing
with ei vil servants. The representativity of councilors varies. The general public
has of ten been rather apathetic towards consultation exercises.
Montgomery, J.D.: Allocation of Authority in Land Reform Programs: A
Comparative Study of Administrative Processes and Outputs, in Administrative
Science Quarterly, voL. 17, no. 1, 1972, pp. 62-75.
This study compares administrative arangements for land reform implementation
and their outputs in 25 developing countries. Output refers to whether peasants got
a more secure tenure, higher incomes, had their political strength improved, and
whether the administration became more capable of serving the farming
communities.
Three types of administrative arrangements for land reform implementation are
identified: (1) Centralised, national structures control implementation. This type
produced poor results, except that farmers obtained more secure tenure. This is
because the land owning elites often have the best access at this leve!, and the
poor peasants' access is minimaL. The experience of the problems and the under-
standing of the need for improvements are also weakest in the capital. (2)
Decentralisation to several specialised organs, to autonomous special task agencies
or to provinces and regions. The results were better in these cases, but these
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organs are also linked to strong socio-economic interests and tend to undermne
reforms. (3) Devolution, i.e. that implementation was left to political leaders and
organs at the localleveL. This type also runs the risk of local elite control, but in
the cases where this was avoided, results were good. Elitism can be avoided by
giving a key role to elected organs and by providing them with technical expertise.
Devolution makes information more easily available, the implementors are more
motivated, the communications are better, and community solidarity is srronger.
For these reasons, devolution produced the best results.
The choice of administrative arrangements is mainly related to regime intentions
and seriousness. Administrative traditions may also be of importance, as well as
the actual conditions in the rural areas.
Mutahaba, Go: Reforming Public Administration for Development. Experiences
from Eastern Africa. Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1989.
In this book Mutahaba examines man y forms of public administration reform,
inc1uding decentralisation (Ch. 4). Decentralisation is defined as the transfer of
responsibility for management and decision making from the central state to sub-
national units. Such units may inc1ude NGOs, field organisations or local
autonomous bodies. He distinguishes between deconcentration and devolution.
Deconcentration is the transfer of responsibilities within the state bureaucracy.
Responsibility is transferred to a local prefect, to functionally specialised agencies
or to both with the aim of prefect coordination. Devolution, on the other hand, is
a more radical form of decentralisation. It inc1udes a far-reaching transfer of power
to a political body at the sub-nationallevel. Few LDCs have ever really tried this
as central supervision and financial control have normally remained strong.
Devolution, moreover, depends on a corresponding measure of deconcentration.
The arguments for decentralisation are numerous, and may be grouped as follows:
(1) Efficient administration; (2) increasing responsiveness; (3) facilitation of
national development goals, i.e. to facilitate implementation of national policies
and programmes.
The obstac1es to decentralisation reforms have been: (1) Inadequate organisational
resources at the local leveL, and inconsistent and unc1ear division of work and
responsibility; (2) central leve L interferenee and lack of commtment to
decentralisation reforms; (3) the ruling elite's fear of real participation and power
sharing; (4) resource scarcity; and (5) inadequate coordinating mechanisms. These
general points are made after detailed examinations of decentralisation reforms in
Zambia, Tanzania and Kenya. The lack of resources and lack of political
commtment are singled out as crucial obstacles.
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Mutizwa-Mangiza, N.: Local Government and Planning in Zimbabwe. With
Special Reference to the Provincial/Regional LeveL, in N. Mutizwa-Mangiza
and AHJ. HeImsing: Rural Development and Planning in Zimbabwe.
Aldershot/rookfield: Avebury, 1991A
Decentralisation is a hotly debated issue in Zimbabwe, and reform proposals were
forwarded in the late eighties. Decentralisation is believed to counter the problems
of the earlier centralised system, to improve equity in public policy, and to cope
better with the increasing complèxities of major policies. This artic1e assesses the
reforms critically.
The author recognises the importance of resource provision, political commitment
and supervision as conditions for successful local government, but focuses in
particular on the weakesses of the proposed formal structure of sub-national
governments. His critique can be summarised as follows: (1) Divisions of work
and responsibility are unclear and overlapping. This wil most likely lead to
confusion and unc1ear loyalties. (2) The influence of elected representatives in
planning processes is not well catered for. (3) The reforms envisage that planning
should take place at district, provincial and state leveIs. What autonomy each level
should have in relation to the others is unc1ear. (4) It is unc1ear how various types
of planning (i.e. physical planning, economic planning, and planning of sectoral
activities) wil be integrated. (5) The links between planning and implementing
agencies are unc1ear.
There is thus a need for substantial c1arifications in the proposed organisational
design. An additional problem is that after 1980, many ministries launched major
programmes and reforms and many of the m improvised cooperative arrangements
with local level units. How these arrangements wil be dealt with in a new
decentralised structure is unc1ear.
Mutizwa-Mangiza, N.: Decentralization in Zimbabwe. Problems of Planning at
the District LeveL, in N. Mutizwa-Mangiza and AHJ. HeImsing (eds.): Rural
Development and Planning in Zimbabwe. Aldershot/rookfield: A vebury,
1991B.
The aim of this artic1e is to examine the problems faced by the sub-national
planning system of Zimbabwe. The importance of effective planning is reinforced
by the long neglect of the majority of the population, by the civil war, and by the
need to reconcile the dual structure of both society and the Government. The sub-
national system is described as a mixture of devolution and deconcentration, The
former is denoting the powers transferred to elected and semi-autonomous
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councils, and the latter is denoting the discretion transferred to local branches of
functional ministries and the generalist prefect in the districts.
Under the planning system, councils at vilage and ward leve! give inputs to
district planning. District planning is integrated in the provincial plan, which is
being forwarded to the ministerial level for integration with national planning.
However, this system has many deficiencies: (1) Poor coordination and low
political control; (2) difficulties in achieving inputs from the lowest 1evels of
popular consultation; (3) planning at lower levels has an undefined status, and it
is unc1ear whether the district input has any effect on the national planning where
public policies are finally decided; (4) the state's financial and budgetar controls
over the sub-national organs make autonomy almost negligible; (5) planning
processes are unc1early related to budgeting; (6) what sub-district plans should
contain and what purpose they should serve are not c1ear; (7) poor specialisation
and coordination in the districts and between district and other levels create
confusion; and (8) poor capacity and expertise at sub-nationallevels.
Naustdalslid J.: Introduction and Background to Workshop on Local Government
and Development, in J. Naustdalslid (ed.): Local Government and Develop-
ment. Workshop on Local Government and Development, NIBR, Oslo, 1991.
The author argues that development of viable local governments is important and
necessary, because it is a crucial component in the institutional development in
Africa. Development in general as well as donor aid depend on the existence of
sound governmental institutions. In as far as developmental problems have their
roots within a country, the institutional factors wil be of relevance. Frustration
because of poor bureaucratic performance is the immediate reason why institution
building is on the agenda.
Institutional development cannot be imposed from the outside, and it takes time.
It must be an indigenous development, based on learning from other countries as
well as learning from experiences made in the country in question. Donor
contributions should not the least be to support such indigenous research.
Important research challenges are: (1) What factors affect institutional
performance? (2) What creates legitimacy and support among the local people? (3)
How can donors contribute to institutional development?
Nells J.R. and Rondinell, D.: Assessing Decentralization Policies in Developing
Countries: The Case for Cautious Optimism, in Development Policy Review,
voL. 4, no. 1, 1986, pp. 3-23.
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Decentralisation is increasingly being promoted in LDCs. The reasons are donor
pressures, poor performanee of centralised policy making and implementation
structures, policy changes emphasising equity and poverty alleviation andfinally,
financial problems in many countries. The objectives formulated in decentralisation
reforms are numerous: (1) Improved mobilisation of support for public policies;
(2) reduction of the workload for the central state; (3) improved adaptabilty in
implementation; (4) better information to policy makers about local problems,
preferences and opportunities; (5) national unit y by letting people exert influence
and thus have a stake in the state system; (6) more equitable allocation among
districts and groups; (7) facilitate maintenance of investments; (8) improved
administrative penetration of the country; (9) improved coordination; and (10)
decentralisation as a norm and a value in itself.
Perhaps the most common definition of decentralisation and local government is
the one presented by Nellis and Rondinell. They distinguish between four types:
(1) Decon-centration: Transfer of management responsibility and some diseretion
to adjust policies, within the bureaucratic organisations of the state; (2) Delegation:
Clearly de fine d functions are made the responsibility of relatively independent
organisations, e.g. parastatals, whereby these organisations are given rather wide
discretionary powers, and are not directly controlled by superior hierarchical
leveIs; (3) Devolution: Strengthening of sub-national units, with a defined legal
existence, outside ordinary hierarchical control and with a certain autonomy. The
local government must also be responsible to the local constituency; (4)
Privatisation: The state withdraws from certain tasks and leaves it to the market,
to NGOs or to self-help organisations to meet the needs in question. These can all
take a variety of forms, and existing local government structures also combine
these four types in numerous ways.
Implementation of decentralisation reforms depends on: (1) Support and
commitment from bureaucratic and political power-holders at the centrallevel; (2)
values, attitudes and culture conducive to decentralisation and local self-help and
responsibility; (3) programmes designed in ways that pro mote decentralisation; and
(4) availability of resources. These conditions are of ten not present and
decentralisation must therefore develop slowly and incrementally. Reforms must
be simple, accompanied by resources and training. Support for decentralisation
must be built by show ing results and progress. It has to be recognised that
decentralisation might be costly and time-consuming in the short run. We do not
know enough about the actual effects of decentralisation reforms, but it seems that
participation, local autonomy, improved planning and management capacity and
improved equity have been achieved in some instances. However, progress is at
best incremental, and future reforms should aim at progressing slowly.
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Nkya, E.Jo: Local Government in Tanzania, in 1. Naustdalslid (ed.): Local
Government and Development. Workshop on Local Government and
Development. Oslo: NIBR, 1991.
There are three main constraints on local government performance in Tanzania:
(1) Financial problems; (2) political problems related to pary interference, low
legitimacy, poor performance and decreasing legitimacy; and (3) institutional
problems - complex and poorly coordinated organisational division of work,
unintended central control, lack of resources, low abilty to link administrative
procedures to paricipation.
Varying performance is related to the local governments ' relations with the private
sector, the patron-c1ient networks, interest conflicts in the local community, the
central government' s relationship with local governments, donor assistance,
ethnicity, socio-economic problems, and the local people. There is a need to
advance the knowledge of these relations and their effects on local government
performance.
Olowu, D. and Smoke P.: Determinants of Success in African Local
Governments: an Overview, in Public Administration and Development, voL. 12,
no. 1, 1992, pp. 1-17.
There is a renewed interest in decentralisation and local government in Africa
because of: (1) Economic decline and donor pressure; (2) awareness of the ability
of local governments to promote economic growth; (3) increasing demands for
popular paricipation; (4) cutbacks in public spending related to structural
adjustment programmes; (5) population increase and urban growth.
In attempting to identify the determinants of successfullocal governments, Olowu
and Smoke give a rather wide definition of successful decentralisation. They
de fine local governments as successful when they control substantial resources and
provide a reasonable leve! of services. The determinants of success in this rather
wide sense are: (1) Among successes, urban local councils dominate. (2) Size is
not critical for revenue generation. (3) All the examined success-cases are
designed on the colonial model for local government. (4) The successful cases are
alllocated in regions that are relative ly well developed economically. (5) Success
is dependent on c1ear responsibilities and powers, and many of the success cases
have powers and responsibilities fairly close to the colonial model. (6) Revenues
come from indirect taxation on economic activities. (7) Most of the cases have one
or a few revenue sources that are dominant. (8) Most of them have local authority
enterprises as an important source of revenue. (9) They vary greatly concerning
the proportion of their budgets that comes from central government grants. (10)
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All successful local governments are relatively c10sely supervised by the central
state. (11) There is a cooperative relationship between councilors and offcers.
(12) There are formalised coordination arrangements with the prefect. (13) There
are arrangements for consultation of the citizenry.
Pausewang, S.: Local Democracy and Central Contra!. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen
Institute, 1988 (DERAP Working Papers A 382).
This paper is based on data from Ethiopia. The state - district relationship had
been characterised by extreme central control and oppression. Furthermore, the
relationship was exploitative as the state's main interest was to expropriate
resources from the peasants, and spend them to the benefit of the state and the
urban population. The author poses the decentralisation problem as how to get rid
of central government' s exploitation of the peasant population. The institutional
problem is to establish local institutions that are not tools for such exploitation,
and which may allow for indigenous local collective self-help and development.
The collapse of the imperial state apparatus gave an opening for genuine local
organisation. The potential of the peasants to organise was impressive which does
not mean there were not problems of corruption and nepotism. Hostility to urban
citizens and to outside advice and assistance were also reported. Furthermore, the
ne ed for food supplies to the urban poor were not attended to. Finally, the state
was blocked from access to resources it needed to exist. Thus, some sort of state
intervention was needed. However, the intervention proved destructive when it
came. The revolutionary regime consolidated itself, and regained control of local
institutions whereby much of what was achieved was subsequently undermined.
Development has to start with local controlover and effective use of
resources.This is the only way to secure real democracy as well. The period of
state collapse showed the capabilities of local peasants. State rule can and should
be rather cautious and allow large local freedom for peasant self-rule.
Picard L.: District Councils in Botswana-a Remnant of Local Autonomy, II
Journal of Modern African Studies, voL. 17, no. 2, 1979A, pp. 285-308.
Why has the district council survived in Botswana? The councils have experienced
severe deficiencies because of shortage of resources, inadequate manpower,
administrative inefficiency, and state interference. Deficiencies of the same type
and magnitude have led to abolishment in other countries.
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There are three main explanations: (1) District Councils were introduced very late
in the colonial phase, and colonialism did not end in a bitter liberation struggle.
The councils are therefore not associated with colonial repression. (2) A powerful
ministry has defended the continued existence of councils because these councils
were controlled by this ministry , and were an asset in its attempts to acquire
resources and status. The ministry has thus defended the councils when they came
under attack. (3) The regime has been eager to pre serve an image of liberal
democracy and public debate, and the councils have been functional for the regime
as arenas for this. On the other hand, the councils have been very weakly
connected to actual decision making, and the debates and decisions in them have
therefore not constituted any threat to central control. What has been decentralised
is not decision making, but political criticism.
Picard, L.: Rural Development in Botswana: Administrative Structures and Public
Policy, in The Journal of Developing Areas, voL. 13, no. 3, 1979B, pp. 283-300.
At independence, Botswana inherited a British-inspired local government system
and a prefectorial District Administration. After a period of centralisation during
the 1960s, increased rural development activity placed decentralisation on the
agenda again around 1970. Picard examines what determined the outcome of the
processes deciding the decentralised structure, and the rural development policies
that were developed in conjunction with this.
The reform aimed at increasing the role of the prefectorial District Administration,
which should form the leadership and coordinating mechanism for the ministerial
field services, local councils and tribal administration, These should meet in the
District Development Committee, chaired by the District Commissioner (the
prefect). A District Administration officer should serve as the DDC seeretary. This
organisation was decided by the ruling elite in control of the state, and the actors
in the districts had no say in these matters.
After conflct and bargaining between the ministries of finanee and local govern-
ment, it was decided that expatriates should fil the new positions, that they should
report to the Ministry of Local Government, and that councils should still have
some decision makng powers. This meant a victory to the Ministry of Local
Government in its struggle with the Ministry of Finance over who should control
and use the district structure. In the whole process, the key decision makers were
these two ministries, and their main criteria for choice were influence and power
between them; not what would benefit the districts.
The rural development policies that this district structure should be in charge of
were also developed at the centrallevel to a large extent. Expatriates have
influenced policies considerably, but only within guide lines set by the national
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political ruling elite and effectively enforced by the same elite. The policy was to
pre serve existing socio-economic structures, to invest mainly in infrastructure
projects, and it was guided by general pragmatism.
Picard, L.: Socialism and the Field Administrator. Decentralization in Tanzania,
in Comparative Politics, voL. 12, no. 4, 1980, pp. 439-457.
The artic1e examines the motives behind the Tanzanian decentralisation reform in
1972, and assesses the extent of goal realisation. The motives were to democratise
government decision making and to improve administrative efficiency. Important
background factors for the reform inc1ude ideological principles and the ne ed to
implement the many huge developmental schemes that Tanzania launched in this.
period. The reforms have enhanced the administrative deconcentration to the
regional and partly to the district level, but the political devolution has not been
paralleI to this. The political leadership in the regions and districts were given a
weak position relative to the administration due to poor competence and missing
mechanisms for political control. The politicalleadership is mainly composed of
appointed pary officiaIs. Representative organs are missing, and direct
consultation and participation have thus not been forthcoming. Stil, Picard
conc1udes that even if the reform became mainly a deconcentration reform, it has
improved administrative coordination in decision making, and it has led to a more
responsible relationship between administration and clientele in the districts. After
all, he contends, civil servants based in the districts do have a better perception
and understanding of local issues than an offcial based in the capital.
Picard, L.: Independent Botswana: The District Administration and Political
Control, in Journal of African Studies, voL. 8, no. 3, 1981, pp. 98-110.
It has of ten been argued that the colonial administrations were too oriented
towards rules, hierarchy, control and status quo, and that development required a
new type of bureaucracies as well as a new type of civil servants. Not the least
has this been argued with reference to the prefectorial district administrations.
These changes did of ten not occur. Picard discusses why the District
Administration of Botswana has remained control- and rule-oriented. His main
thesis is that the ruling elite has deliberately kept the District Administration
unchanged. The District Commissioner is an important ruling elite agent, and
reports directly to the President' s Office in matters of relevance for security and
political events in the districts.
The ruling elite perceives the District Administration primarilyas a to ol for
political control. Of particular importance is that the District Administration is in
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charge of supervising the functioning of traditional authorities and the Tribal
Administration. The traditional authorities are perceived to be the most dangerous
potential opposition force against the regime.
Prior to the election set-backs for the regime in 1969, control was mainly about
supervision of the traditional authorities and reporting of political developments.
During the election campaign, control also inc1uded active mobilisation and overt
control. After 1969, political control has also implied that the district
administration secures support from other agencies for the implementation of
projects of political significance, i.e. visible infrastructure projects. Control was
a main tas k for the District Commssioner under British rule, and remained so
after independence.
Picard, L.: Traditionalism, the Bureaucracy, and Local Administration: Continuity
and Change in Swaziland, in Journal of African Studies, voL. 13, no. 4, 1986,
pp. 116-125.
Local government in Swaziland is in a situation of paralysis and deadlock, and the
explanation for this is a combination of factors related to social c1asses' struggle
for state power. The colonial power left the political and administrative structures
of the king relatively untouched during the colonial period, and it was the king
who seized power after independence. The monarchy had its power base in the
traditional socio-economic elites. Gradually, a new middle class of farmers, civil
servants and small entrepreneurs emerged. These groups were blocked from
political power and hence from the state' s resources.
The local government system that was introduced in the 1970s became a battle-
ground between these two main social forces. The king wanted to prevent the new
middle c1ass groups from gaining control of the local governments, while the
growing middle c1ass was strong enough to paralyse local government as long as
they were kept outside it. The result has been deadlock and the local government
reforms have been brought to a halt until the struggle for power between
traditional and modern social groups comes to a conc1usion.
Rondinell, D.: Government Decentralization in a Comparative Perspective, in
International Review of Administrative Sciences, voL. 47, no. 2, 1981A, pp. 133-
145.
Decentralisation is increasingly being sought by LDC governments after a period
of centralisation. It has, however, proved difficult to introduce working
decentralised systems. Decentralisation is defined as the transfer of legal and
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political authority to plan, decide and manage public functions from the central
state to sub-national organs. The degree of decentralisation varies. The weakest
form is deconcentration, which is defined as delegation of routine decisions and
some discretion downwards in the national hierarchies. The exercise of discretion
is under the direct hierarchical supervision of headquarers. Delegation refers to
a wider transfer within defined functional areas, and the exercise of the delegated
authority is not under direct hierarchical control. Examples would be parastatals
or special development authorities. Devolution is defined as transfer of authority
in several functional areas to organs that are not under direct hierarchical control
of the state. In the case of devolution, the local government controls its own
resources and is responsible to the local people and may act independently towards
the central state.
The expected benefits of decentralisation are numerous: (1) Adjustment to local
variation; (2) reduced rigidity and red tape; (3) improved knowledge about
people's needs and problems; (4) mobilisation and penetration of the periphery;
(5) improved capacity in the districts; (6) reduced workload in central departments
and ministries; (7) improved coordination, flexibility and creativity; (8) more
suitable localisation of infrastructure and service points; (9) higher efficiency for
complex and integrated programmes; and (lO) for popular participation, improved
equity, knowledge of needs and problems, reduction of the power of local elites,
and higher national identification.
Implementing decentralisation reforms has proved difficult. The problems are
numerous: The political support is not adequate, and there are often hidden
motives of improved control through decentralisation. The central bureaucrats are
not supportive, partly because they have their own power ambitions, partly because
they distrust the expertise of 10calleve1 officers. Communications are poor, and
conditions in the districts are not well know n in the capital. Decentralisation is
often accompanied by a lot of new control and monitoring measures which under-
mine autonomy and morale at the locallevel. The central ministries have neither
the resources nor the capacity to give sufficient technical and financial support.
The local organisations themselves suffer from lack of resources and personneI.
Participation is made meaningless by not being linked to control of resources
locally. In many cases, the local tax base is too limited. In many districts the
infrastructure is poor, and the district does not function as a unit. Social and
economic integration often do not coincide with district boundaries. In many
districts, there are few or no enterprises, NGOs and interest organisations that can
interact with the local government as expected. Resistance from local elites, as
decentralisation reforms have often aimed at weakening them. Centrist attitudes
among officers both in the central ministries and in the local administration and
councils.
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Rondinell, D.: Administrative Decentralization and Economic Development: The
Sudan's Experiment with Devolution, in Journal of Modern African Studies,
voL. 19, no. 4, 1981B, pp. 595-624.
Sudan has launched decentralisation reforms in two stages in the 1970s. In the
early seventies, a deconcentration reform centred on the province level. Some
years later, a reform aimed at furthering deconcentrated responsibility and popular
participation was launched. Rondinell gives a detailed review of the contents of
these reforms and the problems they encountered. The main concern, however, is
to examine the conditions for effective implementation of such reforms. These are
as follows: (1) Support and commitment from political and administrative leaders
at central, regional and locallevel. This implies acceptance of power transfers and
active support to the organs with new responsibilities.(2) Clearly defined
structures, i.e. division of work and authority, and c1early defined procedures for
planning, budgeting and reporting. These processes also have to be both simple
and flexible. (3) Realistic assessments about what those who receive new tasks are
capable of doing. This problem has several dimensions. One is the availability of
resources, personneI and qualified manpower of the needed types. Another is the
culture of the local governments, which is not always conducive to decentralisa-
tion. (4) A minimum of general development. If communications and transport as
well as involvement in the formal economy are more or less absent, decentralisa-
ti on is not feasible.
Ross, M.H.: Political Organization and Political Participation. Exit, V oice and
Loyalty in Pre-Industrial Societies, in Comparative Politics, voL. 21, no. 1,
1988, pp. 73-89.
Why does the extent of political participation vary? One theory argues that it
increases as the resource base in society increases. An alternative theory argues
that paricipation depends on the political organisation of society. Participation has
two dimensions. First, the extent of the involvement: Is participation for the few
or for large proportions of society? Second, the range of participatory decision
makng: Are decisions limited to a few fields or are they concerned with a large
range of issues? The author has examined determnants of participation in
traditionally organised societies within modern African states.
The main finding is that political power is increasingly concentrated as socio-
economic complexity in society increases. The people's involvement decreases
under these circumstances. Seen in the light of the resource base theory, this is
surprising. Ross explains this by arguing that in relatively advanced African
societies, exit is not an option because resources are not mobile (land) and because
strong cross-cutting ties are developed. When exit is difficult, power holders can
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abstain from allowing voice. In industrial and primitive societies, this is not the
case. Furthermore, in most African societies, loyalty reduces exit options because
it links people tightly to communities.
Ross concludes that it is superficial to consider development level as a determinant
of political participation. It depends on the specific structures that allow or inhibit
voice and exit, and that result in varying degrees of loyalty. He suggests that in
primitive societies, exit is easy and paricipation (voice) is thus necessary to
maintain the local system. With increasing development, exit is less easy and
voice is thus not allowed, unless the existence of cross-cutting ties create groups
that form the basis for voice. With high development leveIs, industrial societies
have increased options for exit and thus voice increases again. Concerning most
African societies, they are in the middle in this three-step model, where voice is
restricted unless various legitimate associations and cross-cutting ties give a basis
for some voice. But this, Ross contends, has a limited democratic potential as
voice in such societies is often ritualised and weakly linked to decision-making.
Samoff, J.: The Bureaucracy and the Bourgeoisie: Decentralization and Class
Structure in Tanzania, in Comparative Studies in Society and History, voL. 21,
no. 1, 1979, pp. 30-62.
At independence, Tanzania opted for centralisation. The rationale was to control
scarce resources efficiently, to facilitate strategic action, to integrate the nation,
and to provide donors with one single point of responsibility. A major reason why
the centralised model failed was its inability to mobilise target groups for policies
and programmes. Samoff details the decentralisation efforts in Tanzania in the
1970s, and shows that the democratisation component remained weak in spite of
increased participation bein g a major official goal of the reforms. This is partly
explained by the weak power and competence that were given to representative
organs, but also by the orientation of local government officers. This orientation
was characterised by a definition of development as a technical exercise. People's
participation was at best seen as aneeessary symbolic exercise and as a source of
information for the governmental decision-makers.
Why do the Tanzanian governmental institutions perceive development and
decentralisation in such a technical and a-political manner? Samoff contends that
the reason is the class structure in Tanzania. The ruling class has the state itself
as a basis for economic power, and cannot open it up for participation, as it could
have done if its economic power was located in the private economy. However,
there were countervailing powers against this technocracy. Peasants have chosen
exit and protest and of ten with success, thus blocking central government policies.
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Samoff, J.: Bureaucrats, Politicians and Power in Tanzania. The Institutional
Model of Class Struggle, in Journal of African Studies, voL. 10, no. 3, 1983, pp.
84-96.
Samoff's main objective is to examine how class conflct manifests itself in
political behaviour in the field of building local government institutions in
Tanzania. The bureaucracy is the dominant faction of the ruling dass, and it is
their perceived class interest that determines the changing conditions for local
government. Because the economic interests of the dominant dass are in the state
itself, real popular participation cannot be allowed. The opposing c1asses, in
particular the petty bourgeoisie in the more prosperous districts, conquered some
of the elected councils that were inherited from the British, and managed to have
their class interests defined as the district s interests. As a response, the dominant
bureaucratic dass abolished local councils, and strengthened the regional
administration instead. Legitimacy was after this reform sought not in democratic
principles, but in superior technical knowledge. This base of legitimacy was
gradually undermined as actual development results did not materialise, and this
is what has led to a renewed interest in decentralisation. Local government
institutions are thus arenas where opposing c1asses struggle for power and
resources. Furthermore, c1ass struggles are concerned with the formation of such
institutions as they affect the access of various dasses to political decisions.
Samoff, J.: Popular Initiatives and Local Government in Tanzania, in The Journal
of Developing Areas, voL. 24, no. 1, 1989, pp. 1-18.
Samoff describes the abolishment of Tanzanian local government in the 1960s and
its return in the 1980s. This abolishment is often portrayed as a mistake, as a
failed attempt to accelerate development. To the contrary, Samoff argues that both
to abolish and to resurrect local governments were conscious choices that served
different ruling class purposes. Abolishing local governments reduced the threat
from opposing dasses, i.e. a combination of petty bourgeoisie, local populists, and
traditional authorities based in the districts. Ruling dass interests were thus
secured, but only for a while. Even if the reform improved administrative
performance, it reduced the state' s local legitimacy and made governing and
mobilisation of the people difficult. Local governments are therefore being revived
because legitimacy has become a more serious problem than dass opposition.
Democratic legitimacy wil be improved until the fear of opposition again becomes
the dominant problem, which willead to renewed centralisation and control. This
dilemma between ruling c1ass needs of legitimacy and social control cannot be
¡resolved unless the balance between the main social classes is drastically altered.
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Sikabanze, M.A.: Finanee of Sub-National Development and its Implications for
Public Planning: The Zambian Experience, in A.H.J. HeImsing and K.H.
Wekwete (eds.): Sub-National Planning in Southern and Eastern Africa.
Approaches, Finance and Education. Aldershot/rookfield: Avebury, 1990.
Zambia has experienced a weakening of its public finances during the 1980s, and
the results are increasingly that projects are under-funded, that the administration
cannot fully utilise its capacity and that maintenance is ignored. This situation has
had two important consequences. First, it has led to decentralisation. Local units
are increasingly made responsib1e for implementation, maintenance and funding
of projects. They are expected to mobilise local resources that evade ordinary
taxation. However, the allocations to sub-national government have steadily
decreased, and cover only recurrent costs while local revenues have not increased
as expected. This has led to the second main consequence, namely that invest-
ments are now mainly donor-funded. The donors' contributions are channelled
through central ministries, where local input is low and cross-sectoral coordination
weak. Budgeting and accounts by-pass ordinary procedures, and are thus not
known in national and local planning units The donors also monitor and evaluate
the projects. According to the 1980 reforms, planning of development projects is
a local responsibility. However, the local organs are not given the resources to do
that, and the donor engagement is not conducive to locallevel planning.
Segodi, R.: Financing District Development in Botswana, in P. de Valk and K.H.
Wekwete: Decentralizing for Participatory Planning? Aldershot/rookfield:
Avebury, 1990.
Democratic principles have been the main justification for decentralising planning
to the districts in Botswana. But does the planning system respond to local needs?
The District Development Plan is a general plan for all activities in the district. It
defines problems and potentials, projects to be undertaken and implementation
schedules. However, the National Development Plan defines many premises for
the district plans. Most projects to be implemented locally are national sectoral
projects, decided upon in the ministries. The scope for local priorities is limited
to a number of open programmes in the NDP, which allow districts to submit
various projects within the frames of these NDP programmes. There is thus some
scope for local choice of priorities. This does not necessarily mean that the district
planning is sensitive to local popular needs. Segodi argues that the districts are
more responsible to the central state than to the local communities, and that
devolution should therefore be developed further.
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Sterkenburg, J.: Rural Development and the Evolution of Regional Planning in
Botswana: the Implementation of National Policy in Ngamiland District, in
Journal of Rural Studies, voL. 6, no. 2, 1990, pp. 217-229.
The author examines an example of successful district planning in Ngamiland, a
district in Botswana. The main concern is to assess the conditions for this
successfully performing district planning. He argues that in this particular case, the
success depended on: (1) An effective coordinating unit for line ageneies in the
district; (2) the needs for district planning raised by national programs; (3)
qualified personneI specially dedicated to planning tasks; (4) strict guidelines for
planning procedures; (5) ministerial support and provision of funds; (6) limited
ministerial interference in the planning details; (7) some amount of locally
generated revenues; (8) collection and processing of necessary information; (9)
high quality staff; (10) an established and formalised management and monitoring
system; (11) staff continuity; (12) funding of concrete projects; (13) a viable
district center; (14) posting of staff near the target populations; and (15) support
from the political leadership. Problems encountered were low participation and
local elite resistance to regulations. Ministerial support had in some cases failed,
and delays created problems. Interference from ministerial headquarters were
reduced, but stil happened too of ten.
Tordoff, W.: Ghana, in D.C. Rowat (ed.): International Handbook on Local
Government Reorganization. London, 1980.
Tordoff describes how the local council system of British origin in Ghana failed
to perform adequately. It remained dependent on the central state, and was
corrupted and paralysed by local strife throughout the 1960s. Ghana responded
with a unification of government and abolished elected councils. The new structure
resembled the French prefectorial model. A unified, hierarchical four-tier structure
was to provide an effective national and local development administration.
Decentralisation took the form of administrative deconcentration.
The problems of the resulting four-tier structure have been that it is complex with
large coordination problems. However, the prefectorial system promises an
improvement of administrative performance. Tordoff argues that even if the new
structure wil also have its weaknesses, it is important not to reorganise again too
soon, but to let this system work for a while, and then improve it gradually. The
British model has been tried out, and it worked so badly that abolishing it must
c1early be justified. A main criticism of the deconcentrated model is that it
abolished elected councils, and replaced them with committees with appointed
members. Tordoff recognises this weakness, but argues that deconcentration also
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improves paricipation by moving decision making c10ser to the people.
Participation may take place even if there are no elected councils.
Tordoff, w.: Local Administration in Botswana, in Public Administration and
Development, vo1. 8, no. 2, 1988, pp. 183-202.
The aim of this aric1e is to give a general review of the performance of the sub-
national governmental structure of Botswana, and to point out weaknesses in its
present structure.
In contras t to other African countries, Botswana has had more continuity in local
government, avoiding drastie changes. One reason is the stable and legitimate
power position of the regime. In a two-tier structure, local government consists of
Land Boards, Tribal Administration, District Administration (led by a prefect) and
elected District Councils, all under the control of the Ministry of Local Govern-
ment and Lands. The system is characterised by a power balance among these four
main organs. This balance has changed slowly in favour of the District
Administration. The tri bal administration has had its functions scaled down.
However, the chiefs continue to play a more prominent part than what formal rules
would prediet.
All these organs experience problems due to lack of manpower and resources, lack
of adequate support from the central leve! and lack of control with personneI.
Performance rates for the District Councils have improved, but is still inadequate,
partly due to inadequate relations to MLGL, which tends to interfere and does not
adjust procedures to local government needs. The transfer of responsibilities to the
local authorities has been slow due to inadequate capabilities. Dependence on
centrallevel decisions on personneI and funding constrains local autonomy.
Tordoff argues that the present system is generally adequate. It should be
maintained, steadily strengthened and gradually allowed greater autonomy.
de Valk, Po: State, Decentralization and Participation, in P. de Valk and K.H.
Wekwete (eds.): Decentralizing for Participatory Planning. Aldershot/
Brookfield: A vebury, 1990A.
Local governments are the creations of the post-colonial state, and the main traits
of this state determine the development of local government. The state is
dependent, but it has some autonomy. This autonomy is used by the regime to
pursue its factional interests. The need for decentralisation comes from both the
need for regime legitimacy and from the needs of development administration.
Devolution, i.e. sharing actual decision-making and resource allocation power with
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the local communities reduces the regime's autonomy. Most regimes thus prefer
to maintain legitimacy by means of delivering welfare services. It is mainly when
these services become too expensive that some measure of controlled decentralisa-
tion is sought as a substitute. Both the centralised welfare state and the cautiously
decentralising state maintain autonomy as the masses are not given much
influence on public policy making.
Inc1uding the people in the decision makng and allocation proeess depends on
either a mass- controlled pary, or on a strong mass-oriented ideology in the
regime leadership. if these conditions are present, true devolution is an option.
However, this is seldom the case, and decentralisation reforms consequently are
not open to real popular participation in policy making. The regime in Zimbabwe
is an example. It has dropped its mass-oriented socialist ideology and the party is
not mass-controlled. Consequently, devolution is not allowed.
de Valk, P.: An Analysis of Planning Policy with Reference to Zimbabwe, in P.
de Valk and K.H. Wekwete (eds.): Decentralizing for Participatory Planning.
Aldershot/rookfield: A vebury, 1990B.
The planning system of Zimbabwe is analysed as to what extent it promotes
decentralised decision making and participation. Organisations at the state level,
the provincial level and the district level all play a role in the planning proeess.
Organisations at each level are controlled by different central-level ministries, and
the system is marked by conflict between these ministries.
Some measure of decentralisation can be found. The implementation of the plans
at the district and local levels is open to local influence, and the districts and
provinces give inputs to the final national plan. Stil, the extent of decentralisation
is restricted. Moreover, de Valk argues that decentralisation does not necessarily
promote participation. Decentralising functions to the province level may mean
transfer to alevel where the administration dominates more than it do es in the
capital. if a functional ministry transfers tasks to the sub-national elected bodies,
it may in effect be a transfer to the Ministry of Local Government (MLGRUD)
and not to the local communities. Local organs are not by definition sensitive to
local needs. Local elites may capture local government, and the elected councilors
cannot be assumed to be capable of countering the administration.
Participatory structures are themselves the creation of the centre, and alien to local
communities. Local organisational forms of collective action are of ten dismissed
by these structures. Furthermore, top-down paricipatory structures may become
the centre's control channel. de Valk concludes that the state's needs for control
and the periphery's need for access are difficult to reconcile, and that these two
needs should be met by more separate structures.
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de Valk, P.: Who Sets the Rules for Decentralization? Who Wants to Play the
Game? in P. de Valk and K.H. Wekwete (eds.): Decentralizing for Participa-
tory Planning. Aldershot/rookfield: Avebury, 1990C.
All countries have decentralised structures of some kind. In LDCs, these sub-
national structures represent the central state' s penetration of the periphery. The
general experiences have been: (1) Most people perceive local governments as the
state's creation and expression. (2) Most decentralisation reforms have aimed at
improved administrative efficiency which has not materialised because the
resources and decision-making autonomy have not been provided. (3) Traditional
and legitimate institutions have been built down and by-passed. (4) In all
countries, the centre is strongly represented by a prefectorial branch of the central
administration. (5) In all countries, paricipation and mobilisation have failed,
because local organs have not been allowed to deal with people's felt problems
regarding production, marketing, employment and prices. Local governments have
implemented welfare services which do not render themselves to local influence.
6) In all cases, the limited competence given to local governments has been further
reduced by a variety of approval and fund-release procedures, guidelines and
standards.
There is a tendency to analyse decentralisation either as administrative problems
or as political problems. But these problems are intertwined. Improving sub-
national administration depends on political decisions and sol ving political
problems require corresponding administrative apparatuses. Decentralisation must
be analysed as both administrative and political issues. Furthermore, administrative
arrangements have political implications. Who is served by them? Who controls
an apparatus with improved efficiency? Political structures are of ten hidden in the
administrative arrangements and combined analyses are needed.
Werlin, Ho: Decentralization and Culture: the Case of Monrovia, Liberi, in Public
Administration and Development, voL. 10, no. 2, 1990, pp. 251-261.
Werlin analyses a project where the World Bank funded a project in Liberia. The
Bank pressed for a strengthening of the local government as a part of the project.
The idea was to enable it to take over recurrent costs and maintenance tasks of the
project. This effort failed as it was not consistent with political power structures
and approaches to local government among power holders. Werlin uses this case
to suggest the idea that power wil only be spread through decentralisation if it
contributes to increasing the state' s power. He contends that as lon g as it is
guaranteed that local government activities remain within a common framework
of values, goals, priorities and procedural principles, and the central state is
allowed to define this framework, the central state wil decentralise.
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Decentralisation in conditions like these wil enhance the state' s power and
penetration, and increase its capacity.
Wunsch, J. and D. Olowu (eds.): The Failure of the Centralized State.
Institutions and Self-Governance in Africa. Boulder/Oxford: Westview Press,
1990.
In this book, the authors present a general analysis which wil be briefly outlined
here. In addition, it contains case studies by other authors. Africa's severe
economic and social problems cannot be explained only by external constraints
and natural disasters. Internal factors are also important and the centralisation of
decision makng, implementation and evaluation has prevented African societies
from realising their potential.
Centralisation functions well if the means - ends knowledge is good, if the general
knowledge about society and its variation is good, and if the infrastructure,
resources and feed-back mechanisms for stable centralised bureaucratic control are
present. This is not the case in African societies. Centralisation has therefore led
to failed policies, corruption, exploitation, poor planning, resource waste,
maladministration in the periphery because these areas are not well understood,
to weak administration because the resources do not exist and in some cases, to
oppression. Centralisation has its basis in the coloniallegacy, in the fragility of the
independent regimes, in the search for national unit y, and in development
paradigms at the time of independence.
Development requires complex, flexible, innovative, learning, adaptive and
integrated processes. The centralised African states do not have the resources and
power to organise these processes. The key to development and pro gress is
therefore to allow and facilitate such processes at the 10calleve1, in the hands of
the local people. This implies that real responsibility and decision making powers
must be devolved to local communities, that the state reduces its hold on the
economy, that participation is allowed, that people are allowed to organise
themselves outside the state in order to make paricipation meaningful, and that
government offcers restrict their role to serving the local communities' wishes.
Locally integrated and flexible problem-solving networks must be allowed to
develop. if granted autonomy, local communities do not automatically develop
progressive, problem solving networks. This ability has to be facilitated and
supported. It depends on the establishment of basic rules and principles for
organisation and decision-making. It also depends on basic rules about what is the
proper role for state and communities. These rules about collective action must be
based on indigenous traditions and culture, in order to be legitimate and shared by
all. National political leadership is not for deciding on public policy, it is to
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facilitate local self-help, and to maintain and develop basic rules for collective
action. It is also to provide general policy guidelines and priorities where such are
needed. if the state shares power, state power wil ultimately increase, as the
influence over the local communities wil in the long run be larger than the control
exercised by an inefficient centralised state.
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